Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated by Blitt, Robert C.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 2
2011
Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are
Greatly Exaggerated
Robert C. Blitt
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 347 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol62/iss2/3
 4/19/2012 1:07:08 PM 
  
347 
 
DEFAMATION OF RELIGION: RUMORS 
OF ITS DEATH ARE GREATLY 
EXAGGERATED 
Robert C. Blitt† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the recent decisions by the United Nations 
(“UN”) Human Rights Council and General Assembly to adopt 
consensus resolutions aimed at “combating intolerance, negative 
stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to 
violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief.” 
These resolutions represent an effort to move past a decade’s worth 
of contentious roll call votes in favor of prohibiting defamation of 
religion within the international human rights framework. Although 
labeled “historic” resolutions, this Article argues that the UN’s new 
compromise approach endorsed in 2011—and motivated in part by 
the desire to end years of acrimonious debate over the acceptability 
of shielding religious beliefs from insult and criticism—is problematic 
because it risks being exploited to sanction the continued prohibition 
on defamation of religion and perpetuation of ensuing human rights 
violations on the ground.  
After briefly considering the history of defamation of religion at 
the UN and the strategies employed by its principal proponent, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”), this Article turns to an 
                                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. This Article 
elaborates on remarks made during a panel discussion titled Blasphemy, Religious Defamation, 
and Religious Nationalism: Threats to Civil Speech and Its Suppression at the 2012 Annual 
Meeting for The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) in Washington, D.C. The 
author wishes to thank Jessie Hill and Bernie Meyler for extending the invitation to participate 
on the panel and also to John M. Murray and the staff of the Case Western Reserve Law Review 
for their diligent and timely editorial review of the draft manuscript. 
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assessment of the UN Human Rights Council’s 2011 consensus 
Resolution 16/18. In light of the resolution’s objectives, this Article 
explores the viability of the new international consensus around 
“combatting intolerance” and tests to what extent, if any, the concept 
of defamation of religion may be waning in practice. To this end, this 
Article weighs statements, resolutions, and other undertakings of the 
OIC and its member states with a particular emphasis on activities 
that follow the adoption of Resolution 16/18.  
Based on this analysis, the Article concludes that the resolutions 
on combatting intolerance passed in 2011 represent a Clausewitzian 
moment for many governments, particularly among OIC member 
states. Essentially, support for the new international consensus on 
combatting intolerance represents a cynical and strategic decision to 
continue the campaign to legitimate a ban on defamation of religion 
by other means. Accordingly, even if defamation of religion per se is 
on hiatus from the UN, absent additional measures—including a 
decisive repudiation of the concept’s validity—further international 
efforts to implement measures for combatting intolerance risk 
enabling an alternative framework in which governments continue 
justifying, in the name of protecting religious belief, domestic 
measures that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 1999 through 2011, the United Nations (“UN”) hosted an 
annual struggle between one group of states rallying to establish an 
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion and another 
group that was staunchly opposed to such a move. Over the course of 
twelve years, the debate moved from the defunct UN Human Rights 
Commission to the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) and even 
spilled into the General Assembly (“UNGA”) and other UN 
substructures. These UN bodies passed nearly twenty resolutions that, 
among other things, “[w]elcom[ed] . . . the enactment or 
strengthening of domestic frameworks and legislation to prevent the 
defamation of religions,”1 “[u]nderscor[ed] the need to combat 
defamation of religions,”2 and purported to authorize limitations on 
the right to freedom of expression based on “respect for religions and 
beliefs.”3 In addition to resolutions, these UN bodies also tasked 
different Special Rapporteurs, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and even the UN Secretary General with compiling a total of 
nearly thirty reports dedicated to defamation of religion.
4
  
Admittedly, support for the international prohibition of defamation 
of religion had been dwindling in more recent years, to the point 
where the combination of abstaining states and states voting against 
the annual resolutions outnumbered those voting in their favor.
5
 
Nevertheless, both the UNHRC and UNGA continued to pass these 
                                                                                                                 
1 G.A. Res. 64/156, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Mar. 8, 2010). 
2 Id. ¶ 21. 
3 G.A. Res. 61/164, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2007). 
4 Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom up Journey of “Defamation of Religion” from Muslim 
States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in 56 
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL ISSUE HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW 
POSSIBILITIES/NEW PROBLEMS, app. A, at 121, 200 (Appendix A) (Austin Sarat ed., 2011). 
5 Robert C. Blitt, Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human 
Rights Norms? The Challenge of “Defamation of Religion”, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 19 
(2010). 
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resolutions successfully by a majority vote.
6
 Thus, the gradual decline 
in support should not diminish the diplomatic feat represented by 
UNHRC Resolution 16/18, which was adopted by consensus in 
March 2011.
7
 Notably, this resolution successfully expunged any 
mention of defamation of religion by the UN for the first time in over 
a decade.
8
  
More impressively still, by sidestepping explicit rejection of the 
defamation-of-religion concept, the resolution’s substitute language 
allowed the negotiating parties to extrapolate diametrically opposed 
messages from its content. Thus, on one side, the U.S. was able to 
claim an end to an acrimonious era responsible for creating a “false 
divide that pit[ted] religious sensitivities against freedom of 
expression.”9 At the same time, the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation (“OIC”)10—the principle backer of defamation of 
religion resolutions at the UN—was able to declare Resolution 16/18 
nothing more than the “exploring [of an] alternative approach[].”11 In 
this vein, the OIC continues to advance support for defamation of 
religion “on bloc” among its member states “in the true spirit of 
solidarity and joint action on matters of vital concern . . . .”12 Placed 
in context, these diametrically opposed positions signal a continuing 
divide between the sides and raise questions concerning the viability 
of implementing any consensus resolution in a manner that will 
accord with existing international human rights law. 
After briefly considering the tumultuous history of efforts to 
secure an international prohibition against defamation of religion at 
the UN, including strategies championed by its proponents, this 
Article assesses the UN Human Rights Council’s 2011 consensus 
Resolution 16/18, as well as statements made before and immediately 
                                                                                                                 
6 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (passing a resolution aimed at 
combating the defamation of religions). 
7 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and 
Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons 
Based on Religion or Belief, 16th Sess., Mar. 24, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12, 
2011). 
8 See id. ¶ 1 (stating that the concern was “serious instances of derogatory stereotyping, 
negative profiling and stigmatization of persons based on their religion or belief”).  
9 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) High-Level Meeting on Combating Religious Intolerance (July 15, 
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168636.htm. 
10 This group was formerly known as the Organization for the Islamic Conference. Org. of 
Islamic Cooperation [OIC], On Changing the Name of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, Res. No. 4/38-Org, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/ORG/RES (June 28–30, 2011). 
11 OIC, On Combating Defamation of Religions, Res. No. 35/38-POL, compiled in 
Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 79, ¶ 15, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June 
28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL]. 
12 Id. 
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following its adoption. In light of the resolution’s objectives, this 
Article moves on to explore several related developments to ascertain 
to what extent, if any, the concept of defamation of religion may be 
waning and whether the international consensus around “combatting 
intolerance” represents a viable alternative strategy moving forward. 
Among other things, this Article considers OIC statements and 
resolutions pertaining to defamation—particularly those issued 
following the adoption of consensus resolutions by the UNHRC and 
General Assembly, as well activities in other UN bodies, and other 
related developments on the ground in OIC member states. This 
analysis demonstrates that the shift to “combatting intolerance” 
within the UN has suppressed but not resolved a fundamental and 
ongoing dispute between the “West” and certain other states over the 
nature of international human rights protections and the value of 
universalism. By shifting this debate to an ambiguous and under-
theorized area of law in the name of pursuing and validating an 
“international consensus,”13 these new resolutions risk creating an 
opportunity for certain states to prosecute perceived affronts to 
religious belief with renewed vigor under the imprimatur of 
international law. The likelihood of such a scenario is only heightened 
by the fact that the OIC—the world’s largest international 
organization after the UN—continues to actively identify and endorse 
defamation of religion as a lawful and recognized international norm 
inexorably and legitimately linked to the goal of combating 
intolerance. 
Faced with this reality, this Article concludes that the resolutions 
on combatting intolerance represent a Clausewitzian moment for 
many governments, particularly among OIC member states. In this 
respect, support for the new international consensus on combatting 
intolerance represents merely a cynical and strategic decision to 
continue the campaign to legitimize a ban on defamation of religion 
by other means. While defamation of religion per se might be on 
hiatus from the UN, absent additional clarification—including a 
decisive repudiation of the concept’s validity—further international 
efforts directed at combatting intolerance risk enabling an alternative 
framework for governments to continue justifying domestic measures 
that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion or belief in the name of protecting one or more select 
religious beliefs. 
                                                                                                                 
13 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks 
for Istanbul Process Conference (Dec. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/178640.htm.  
 4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM 
352 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
I. QUO VADIS DEFAMATION OF RELIGION? 
A. Origins and Early History 
For the OIC, the need to prohibit defamation of religion—or, more 
accurately, defamation of Islam—has grown into an overriding raison 
d’être. In the face of initial controversies at the UN predating the first 
defamation of religion resolution issued in 1999,
14
 OIC member states 
proclaimed that the motivation for insulting Islam stemmed only from 
the desire “to generate conflict with Islamic peoples”15 and flatly 
asserted that “the right to freedom of thought, opinion and 
expression could in no case justify blasphemy.”16 
In 1999, the OIC moved to have the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (“UNCHR”) explicitly validate this perspective. Representing 
the OIC, Pakistan called for the adoption of a resolution that urged 
states “to take all necessary measures to combat hatred, 
discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and 
coercion” directed at the religion of Islam.17 Germany’s 
representative criticized this approach “since it referred exclusively to 
the negative stereotyping of Islam, whereas other religions had been 
and continued to be subjected to various forms of discrimination, 
intolerance and even persecution.”18 Germany further reported that it 
“had unfortunately been impossible to find common ground” in initial 
negotiations because OIC member states “had persisted in making the 
draft resolution exclusive in nature and had found it necessary to 
submit sub-amendments to amendments designed to correct the 
balance of the text.”19  
Ultimately, further negotiation led to the UNCHR’s consensus 
approval of a resolution entitled “Defamation of religions.”20 At the 
time, Pakistan hailed the OIC member states’ “considerable 
                                                                                                                 
14 See Blitt, supra note 4, at 142–43.  
15 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n On Prevention of 
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 49th Sess., 35th mtg. ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/SR.35 (Aug. 27, 1997) (providing testimony of the observer for Indonesia, 
“speaking on behalf of the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference”).  
16 U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 65th mtg. ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.65 (Dec. 13, 1994) 
(providing testimony of the representative from Iran, noting “the opinion expressed by the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference”). 
17 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., para. 9, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999) (draft resolution).  
18 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 61st mtg. ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Apr. 29, 1999). 
19 Id. ¶ 9. 
20 Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/82 (Apr. 30, 1999).  
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flexibility” in agreeing to a compromise resolution.21 Germany, on 
behalf of the European Union (“EU”), stressed that the “last-minute 
agreement reached should not . . . hide the fact that a high degree of 
uncertainty remained as to the expediency of the Commission’s 
continuing to deal with the issue in that way and in that context,” 
adding that “they did not attach any legal meaning to the term 
‘defamation’ as used in the title.”22 Despite this view, the consensus 
resolution triggered the first mandated UN reporting on the topic and 
positioned the UNCHR “to remain seized of the matter” moving 
forward.
23
 
The term “seized of the matter” captures literally the UN’s 
preoccupation with defamation of religion over the decade that 
followed. In addition, to attention morphing beyond the relatively 
provincial domain of the UN’s specialized human rights body and 
into the larger (and arguably more important) General Assembly, 
defamation of religion received frequent references in subsequent 
annual resolutions to the point where the term was being referenced 
between ten to fifteen times per resolution.
24
 Notably, this expansion 
was accompanied by a shift away from invoking defamation in the 
relatively harmless context of preambulary front matter to including it 
in the more significant operative paragraphs of a given resolution.
25
  
This change was not accidental. Rather, it coincided with the 
OIC’s stated desire to secure “[o]perative provisions prohibiting 
blasphemy . . . in the text of [defamation resolutions].”26 Moreover, it 
is in part because of this subtle yet dramatic shift that the OIC felt 
sufficiently empowered by 2009 to declare that a norm prohibiting 
defamation of religion had: 
repeatedly been observed to command support by a majority 
of the UN member states—a support that transcended the 
confines of the OIC Member States. The succession of 
UNGA and UNHRC resolutions on the defamation of 
religions makes it a stand alone concept with international 
legitimacy. It should not be made to stand out by creating the 
                                                                                                                 
21 U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 62nd mtg. ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 (Apr. 30, 1999). 
22 Id. ¶ 9. Indeed, at no point in over ten years did the UN ever put forth a working 
definition of the chimera term “defamation of religion.” Blitt, supra note 5, at 16. 
23 Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/82, supra note 20, para. 7. 
24 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (using the term “defamation” 12 
times).  
25 See Blitt, supra note 4.  
26 OIC Secretary-General, Secretary General’s Report On Cooperation Between the OIC 
and Regional & International Organizations, ¶ 23, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ICFM-33/POL/SG.REP.13 
(2006). 
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impression that it somehow encroaches upon the freedom of 
expression.  
. . . .  
[Accordingly, a]ny denial of these facts constitutes a 
contradiction of the established position of the international 
community, the international legitimacy and above all the 
main provisions of international law and international 
humanitarian law.
27
 
To underscore its vow to secure an international prohibition on the 
defamation of religion at the UN,
28
 the OIC regularly passed its own 
internal resolutions addressing defamation of Islam that called into 
question existing international norms related to non-discrimination 
and equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion or belief 
for every individual.
29
 Beyond these annual resolutions, the OIC saw 
fit in its revised 2008 charter to establish “combat[ing] defamation of 
Islam” as one of the organization’s primary objectives.30 To that end, 
the OIC requires, as a precondition for obtaining observer status, that 
interested states provide a commitment to prohibit the defamation of 
Islam.
31
 
Despite the OIC’s consistent position, its promulgation of a norm 
proscribing defamation of Islam remains deeply flawed for several 
reasons. First, the application and enforcement of such a 
blasphemy prohibition typically is discriminatory in practice 
insofar as it protects only the government-sanctioned version of 
Islam.32 Second, the OIC’s requirement that this offense be 
                                                                                                                 
27 Second Rep. of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia, 36th Sess., May 23–25, 2009, 
4–5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC–CS–2ndOBS–REP–FINAL (May 10, 2009).  
28 See OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against 
Islam, Res. No. 34/34-POL, ¶ 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/34-ICFM/2007/POL/R.34 (calling “on the 
Human Rights Council to adopt a universal declaration to incriminate the defamation of 
religions”). Masood Khan, Pakistan’s UN ambassador, also reminded the UNHRC that the 
OIC’s ultimate objective was nothing less than a “new instrument or convention” addressing 
defamation. Steven Edwards, UN Anti-Blasphemy Measures Have Sinister Goals, Observers 
Say, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 24, 2008), 
http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440f-a5de-
6ff6e78c78d5. 
29 For a more detailed analysis of the resolutions leading up to 2010, see Blitt, supra note 
4, at 155. 
30 O.I.C. Charter art. 1, para. 12. 
31 Under Article 6 of the 2011 rules governing observer status at the OIC, an “application 
for Observer Status . . . shall include the applicant’s commitment to and respect for the 
principles and objectives of the Charter . . . .” Rules Governing Observer Status at the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/4-EGG/2011/RES.OS/FINAL. 
32 In certain cases, other select “divine religions” may be afforded protection, at least on 
paper. 
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criminalized is at odds with international efforts to limit penalties 
for conventional defamation offenses to civil liability only. Third, 
and possibly most problematic, the OIC’s impetus for protecting 
Islam by manipulating the framework of international human 
rights upends the foundational understanding that rights belong to 
individuals rather than subjective concepts or beliefs.33 
B. Defamation of Religion Creep: Early Efforts to Blend Defamation 
into Incitement 
The magnitude of the flaws associated with defamation of religion 
virtually assured the decade of clashes at the UN. Indeed, these flaws 
may also help explain the OIC’s attempt to legitimize the end goal of 
protecting Islam against criticism or insult by other means. For 
example, alongside its diplomatic effort to secure an annual 
defamation of religion resolution, the OIC embarked upon an 
increasingly contrived campaign to equate criticism of Islam with 
incitement to religious hatred. This “alternative” approach—
embodied in the OIC’s position within the UNHRC’s Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards to the 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“Ad Hoc Committee”)34—represents nothing more 
than an effort to “reclassify” defamation of religion within the legal 
framework of incitement to make it more palatable to states that have 
either abstained from or voted against the resolutions on defamation.
35
 
                                                                                                                 
33 For a more detailed exploration of these problems, see Blitt, supra note 4. 
34 The Ad Hoc Committee is a UNHRC-created body established in 2006 and mandated 
with elaborating inter alia “a convention or additional protocol(s) to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [“CERD”] . . . providing 
new normative standards aimed at combating . . . incitement to racial and religious hatred.” 
Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up to the 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban  Declaration and Programme of 
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007). The UNHRC’s decision to 
establish the Ad Hoc Committee was split along voting lines similar to those for the defamation 
of religion resolutions. See id. (showing most countries traditionally considered “western” 
voting against the decision and many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, voting for the decision).  
35 Here, it is worth recalling that the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has 
called on governments to “refrain from introducing new norms which will pursue the same 
goals as defamation laws under a different legal terminology such as disinformation and 
dissemination of false information.” Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 
60/251 of March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council,” ¶ 82, Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/4/27 (Jan. 2, 2007) (by Ambeyi Ligabo). 
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The decision to create the Ad Hoc Committee is particularly 
remarkable given that similar earlier efforts failed to demonstrate the 
need for either a convention or additional protocol to the CERD as a 
means of “gap filling” related to incitement to religious hatred. For 
example, experts appointed by the UNHRC to address the content and 
scope of substantive gaps in existing international instruments to 
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related 
intolerance concluded “that religious intolerance combined with racial 
and xenophobic prejudices is adequately covered under international 
human rights instruments.”36 The experts concluded that the gap was 
not in the international instruments themselves, but only in their 
application, which the UN treaty bodies could remedy by issuing 
guidance “as to the interpretative scope . . . [and] threshold of 
application . . . .”37 Reinforcing this conclusion, the 2007 Study of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made no 
mention whatsoever of measures to prevent defamation of religion or 
incitement to religious hatred.
38
 
As part of its lobbying efforts within the Ad Hoc Committee, the 
OIC has sought to blur the critical distinction between defamation of 
religion and incitement by proposing the following: 
[The adoption of] some sort of additional protocol or 
universal declaration for codifying freedom of expression in 
the context of human responsibilities. It may be called an 
additional protocol or universal declaration on ‘‘freedom of 
expression and human responsibilities’’ . . . a comprehensive 
framework is needed for analyzing national laws as well as 
understanding their provisions. This could then be compiled 
in a single universal document as guidelines for legislation—
                                                                                                                 
36 Human Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective 
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Report on the Study by 
the Five Experts on the Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the Existing International 
Instruments to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ¶ 
130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/6 (Aug. 27, 2007). At most, the experts suggested that the 
CERD committee “may wish to consider adopting a recommendation stating explicitly the 
advantages of multicultural education in combating religious intolerance.” Id. The group also 
endorsed “the importance of multicultural education, including education on the Internet, aimed 
at promoting understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations between communities and 
nations” as a means of combating defamation rather than any criminal sanctions. Id. ¶ 149. 
37 Id. ¶ 152. 
38 Human Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective 
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Study of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Possible Measures to Strengthen 
Implementation Through Optional Recommendations or the Update of its Monitoring 
Procedures, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/7 (June 15, 2007). 
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aimed at countering “defamation of or incitement to religious 
hatred and violence.”39 
To further obfuscate the distinction between defamation and 
incitement, the OIC has continued to advocate that the Ad Hoc 
Committee endorse prohibitions on “deliberate and premeditated 
insults and ridiculing,” “malicious and insulting attacks,” and 
“ridiculing and insulting interpretation” of Islam40 backed by 
sweeping criminal sanctions. Supporting this position, the OIC’s 
voting allies within the Africa Group (which itself includes OIC 
member states) have argued that the ‘‘scourges’’ of “‘Islamophobia,’ 
‘Anti-Semitism,’ ‘Christianophobia’ and ‘ideological racism’” should 
“be criminalized in all their manifestations, and made punishable 
offences in accordance with international human rights law.”41 Under 
the theme ‘‘[a]dvocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and 
religious hatred,” the Africa Group demanded the Ad Hoc Committee 
endorse criminal punishment for those perpetrating, “instigating, 
aiding or abetting” the following actions: 
(a) Public insults and defamation . . . against a person or 
group of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion . . . ; 
(b) The public expression of prejudice that has the purpose or 
effect of denigrating a group of persons on the basis of the 
above-mentioned grounds; 
(c) The public dissemination or distribution, or the production 
of written, audio or visual or other material containing 
                                                                                                                 
39 Transcript of the Concluding Session of the Seminar on Articles 19 and 20, Organized 
By the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switz., Oct. 2, 2008, Remarks 
by Mojtaba Amiri Vahid, Deputy of the Permanent Observer Missions of the OIC to the UN 
Office in Geneva, 3 (emphasis added) (transcript on file with the author). In the same statement, 
Vahid downplayed the efficacy of education and dialogue without the imposition of additional 
criminal sanctions. 
40 These forms of expression are expressly rejected in the text of the ambassador’s letter. 
Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations and Other International 
Organizations (Oct. 29, 2009), in Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of 
Discrimination: Comprehensive Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Durban Declaration 
and Programme of Action, Human Rights Council, Feb. 17, 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/CRP.1 
(Annex 1).  
41 Human Rights Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary 
Standards, Outcome Referred to in Paragraph 2(D) of the Road Map on the Elaboration of 
Complementary Standards, ¶ 6(d), UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2 (Aug. 26, 2009) [hereinafter UN 
Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2]. See also African Group Action Points for the “Outcome” Document on 
Complementary International Standards (submitted by Egypt on behalf of the Africa Group) 
(on file with author) (stating same). 
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manifestations of racism and racial discrimination . . . 
[including defamation of religion].
42
  
Similarly, addressing the theme of ‘‘[d]iscrimination based on 
religion or belief’’ within the Ad Hoc Committee, the OIC called for, 
inter alia, criminal liability for those “who commit, instigate, or aid 
and abet . . . directly or indirectly” the following:  
(d) . . . public insults and defamation threats against a person 
or a grouping of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion 
. . . ; [and] 
(e)  . . . publication of material that negatively stereotypes, 
insults, or uses offensive language on matters regarded by 
followers of any religion or belief as sacred or inherent to 
their dignity as human beings, with the aim of protecting their 
fundamental human rights.
43
 
Nowhere in the OIC’s submissions testing the boundaries of 
advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious 
hatred does the organization stipulate or explore the need for 
normative standards that would balance protection against 
“defamation” with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion or belief. In this context, the OIC fails to acknowledge or 
address standards that would relate to evidence of actual defamation, 
the requirement of intent, ascertaining the connection between 
perceived insult and actual incitement, or the principle of 
proportionality.  
Also missing is any recognition that Article 20(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) is 
intended to target only the most extreme purposeful advocacy of 
incitement to imminent forms of discrimination, hostility, and 
                                                                                                                 
42 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 20 (emphasis added). The OIC’s leap 
towards inclusion of defamation of religion is premised on the finding by a “former Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance . . . that the increasing trend in defamation of religions cannot be dissociated from a 
profound reflection on the ominous trends of racism [and] racial discrimination . . . .” Id. ¶ 69. A 
letter from Iran’s mission to the UN reiterates this position. See Letter from Permanent Mission 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Anti-
Discrimination Unit (May 29, 2009) (on file with author). 
43 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The language in 
Part (d) indicates that the Ad Hoc Committee may have lost something in translation. The 
original OIC submission does not require that the offense of defamation be directed at a person: 
“legal restrictions to public insults and defamation, public incitement to violence, threat against 
a person or a grouping of persons . . . on the grounds of their race, colour, language, religion, 
nationality, or national or ethnic origin.” Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the 
United Nations and other International Organizations (May 30, 2009). 
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violence.
44
 This high threshold prompted the UN Special Rapporteur 
on freedom of religion or belief to conclude that “expressions should 
only be prohibited under Article 20 if they constitute incitement to 
imminent acts of violence or discrimination against a specific 
individual or group.”45 The Special Rapporteur further cautioned:  
against confusion between a racist statement and an act of 
defamation of religion. The elements that constitute a racist 
statement are not the same as those that constitute a statement 
defaming a religion. To this extent, the legal measures, and in 
particular the criminal measures, adopted by national legal 
systems to fight racism may not necessarily be applicable to 
defamation of religion.
46
  
Against these findings, the OIC’s demand for wide-ranging 
mandatory criminal liability for defamation-based offenses in the 
context of incitement to religious hatred neglects the need for a fact 
specific and contextual inquiry into such prosecutions and, moreover, 
is woefully out of touch with existing international norms. The blunt 
conclusion issued jointly nearly a decade ago by the UN and 
Organization of American States (“OAS”) special rapporteurs on 
freedom of expression together with the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) Representative on Freedom of the 
Media is also worth recalling: 
Criminal defamation laws . . . are unnecessary to protect 
reputations. The threat of criminal sanctions[,] imprisonment 
and prohibitive fines . . . exerts a significant chilling effect on 
freedom of expression which cannot be justified. Criminal 
defamation laws are frequently abused, being used in cases 
which do not involve the public interest and as a first, rather 
                                                                                                                 
44 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 
20(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) A (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.”); see also ARTICLE 19, THE CAMDEN PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND EQUALITY 10, n.3 (2009) (stating a definition of incitement that is based on 
Article 20(2) as “refer[ring] to statements about national, racial or religious groups which create 
an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence”), and Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, 
& Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of Incitement to National, 
Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 11 (Apr. 
6–7, 2011) (endorsing Principle 12 of Article 19’s Camden Principles), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.  
45 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, 
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human 
Rights Council,” Human Rights Council, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (by 
Asma Jahangir and Doudou Diène). 
46 Id. ¶ 49. 
 4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM 
360 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
than last resort. Criminal defamation laws should be 
abolished and replaced with appropriate civil defamation 
laws.
47
 
The UN Human Rights Committee has consistently reaffirmed this 
viewpoint, calling on states to decriminalize conventional defamation 
laws and to cap the amount of possible damages awarded in civil 
lawsuits.
48
  
Allowing the OIC and others to conflate defamation of religion 
with incitement to religious hostility is problematic for two related 
reasons. First, under the conflated definition, states can use an 
otherwise legitimate international norm to prosecute insults or 
criticism directed at religious beliefs simply by applying a relaxed 
interpretation to terms such as “advocacy,” “incitement” and 
“hostility.” Second, permitting a dilution of the stringent standards 
associated with ICCPR Article 20(2) may have the effect of 
cheapening the coin, which in turn may give rise to other states 
disregarding their obligation to prohibit genuine advocacy of hostility 
that actually constitutes incitement to imminent violence and leaves 
more immediately threatening acts unchecked. 
                                                                                                                 
47 Santiago Canton, Freimut Duve, & Abid Hussain, Statement Regarding Key Issues and 
Challenges in Freedom of Expression (Mar. 7, 2000), 
http://www.ifex.org/international/2000/03/07/report_on_key_issues_and_challenges. In the U.S. 
context, one observer has remarked: 
Criminal libel law . . . is a useless and increasingly unconstitutional remedy for the redress 
of racial or ethnic group defamation. . . . Criminal defamation is not recognized in the Model 
Penal Code or by a leading criminal law treatise. Even though racial and ethnic defamation 
affect the public weal and not merely individual interests, the criminal law of libel is no longer 
effective to redress that group wrong.  
Michael J. Polelle, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly Proposal, 23 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213, 257–258 (2003). 
48 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 24(b),,UN Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2009) (noting 
that the “State party should . . . [d]ecriminali[z]e defamation and subject it only to civil lawsuits, 
capping any damages awarded”); see also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of 
the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, ¶ 20(d), UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (May 17, 2010) 
(suggesting that the State party should “[t]ake steps to decriminalize defamation in all states.”); 
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: The Former 
Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, ¶ 6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2 (Apr. 17, 2008) (noting 
that the Committee “welcomes the amendments to the Criminal Code, decriminalizing the 
offence[] of defamation . . . as steps in the right direction towards ensuring freedom of opinion 
and expression particularly of journalists and publishers”); Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, ¶ 19, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 (Apr. 
24, 2006) (“The State party should ensure that defamation is no longer punishable by 
imprisonment.”). The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 reiterates this 
position: “States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case, 
the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and 
imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.” Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 
34: Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 47, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 
2011). 
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The need to more clearly delineate and preserve this bright line 
distinction is even more pressing due to the nature of the compromise 
struck in Resolution 16/18 and specifically the failure to 
authoritatively repudiate the concept of defamation of religion. By 
agreeing to shift the debate into a decidedly less confrontational space 
made possible by vague terms open to subjective interpretation, the 
United States and others may have complicated the task of identifying 
and effectively confronting limitations on free expression and 
freedom of religion or belief motivated by the desire to curb 
perceived criticism or insult of religious beliefs. Indeed, while 
achieving consensus may be laudable, moving into this mostly 
untested gray zone seems particularly ill-advised given the OIC’s 
ongoing effort to graft defamation of religion onto the framework of 
incitement, even at the expense of delegitimizing existing 
international law. 
II. RESOLUTION 16/18: ENDING A DECADE OF “DIVISIVE DEBATE”? 
A. Resolution 16/18: Crafting a Consensus 
On its surface, UNHRC Resolution 16/18 on “Combating 
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and 
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, 
Persons Based on Religion or Belief”49 represents a turning point 
insofar as it breaks the longstanding UNHRC practice of endorsing an 
annual resolution explicitly decrying defamation of religions. The 
resolution also ends a lengthy paper trail of mandated annual 
reporting dedicated to defamation of religion produced by various UN 
bodies. In place of this, the UNHRC, acting by consensus, agreed to 
condemn “any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,” while recognizing 
that “interfaith and intercultural dialogue . . . can be among the best 
protections against religious intolerance and can play a positive role 
in strengthening democracy and combating religious hatred.”50  
To this end, the resolution sets out a number of concrete 
suggestions intended “to foster a domestic environment of religious 
tolerance, peace and respect”51 and to “promot[e] the ability of 
members of all religious communities to manifest their religion, and 
to contribute openly and on an equal footing to society.”52 For 
                                                                                                                 
49 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7.  
50 Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
51 Id. ¶ 5. 
52 Id. ¶ 6(b). 
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example, the UNHRC calls on states to “[s]peak[] out against 
intolerance, including advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”53 The resolution 
also urges states to adopt, in accord with ICCPR Article 20(2), 
“measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on 
religion or belief.”54 Lastly, the resolution serves—albeit 
unofficially—as the departure point for what has come to be known 
as the “Istanbul Process,” which is a series of meetings intended to 
“spur implementation of the specific actions called for in Resolution 
16/18”55 by, among other things, “sharing best practices.”56 
B. Consensus? Yes. End to Defamation? No. 
Based on the remarks of those states that continue to tout the 
legitimacy of prohibiting defamation of religion, it is evident that the 
putative norm is still very much alive and well, despite the new 
consensus approach intended to supplant it. For example, addressing 
the high level segment of the 16th Session of the UNHRC before it 
passed Resolution 16/18, OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin 
Ihsanoglu reiterated his call for “establishing an Observatory at the 
Office of the High Commissioner to monitor acts of defamation of all 
religions.”57 Ihsanoglu lauded the OIC’s flexibility in negotiations, 
expressing an expectation for “some reciprocity,” and asserted that 
the “perception that supporting [defamation of religion] would 
throttle one’s right to freedom [of] expression is only a myth.”58 
Several weeks later, the ambassador from Pakistan, Zamir Akram, 
articulated the OIC’s view more bluntly in his introductory remarks 
immediately preceding UNHRC adoption of the resolution: 
This draft resolution addresses a number of issues over which 
the OIC has been expressing concern over the years. Having 
                                                                                                                 
53 Id. ¶ 5(e). 
54 Id. ¶ 5(f). That threshold seems to align with American constitutional law and precludes 
criminal sanctions for incitement to discrimination, hostility, or non-imminent violence. See 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium) (noting that incitement is protected 
speech unless the speaker calls for “imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action”). 
55 U.S. Dep’t of State, The “Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief” Implementing Human Rights Council (HRC) 
Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV, 2, 
http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/20111204-Istanbul-Process.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2012). The Istanbul Process is discussed at greater length in Part III.C infra. 
56 Id. 
57 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Sec’y Gen., OIC, Statement at the High Level Segment of the 
16th Session of the Human Rights Council 9 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/9429hrc16sessionoic.pdf. 
58 Id. at 10.  
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said that, I want to state categorically that this resolution does 
not replace the OIC’s earlier resolutions on combatting 
defamation of religions which were adopted by the Human 
Rights Council and continue to remain valid.
59
 
Reinforcing this position, the Saudi Arabian ambassador in his 
explanation before the vote observed that: 
This text contains many positive points . . . . [However,] this 
text . . . is not replacing the other existing text which also 
criminalizes attack on religion. This text still remains valid 
. . . [and events like the burning of the Koran in the United 
States] calls on us all to redouble our efforts against this 
phenomenon.
60
  
Despite these pointed statements, U.S. Ambassador Eileen 
Chamberlain Donahoe chose not to refute the assertion that an 
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion remained 
valid.
61
 Instead, she left it to the representative from Hungary to 
politely demur: “insofar as they are directed at the EU we do not 
agree with the . . . allegations made by the distinguished Ambassador 
of Pakistan in . . . his introduction to this resolution.”62  
                                                                                                                 
59 Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pak. to the U.N. Office at Geneva, 
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24, 
2011) (emphasis added), available at 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2-
eng.rm?start=00:39:20&end=00:49:44. For video of the entire March 24, 2011 proceedings, see 
U.N., 15:00–18:00 46th Plenary Meeting, 
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110324#pm2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
Remarkably, this loaded statement received virtually no press coverage, netting only four hits 
via a Google search. Search Results for “state categorically that this resolution does not replace 
the OIC’s earlier resolutions on combatting defamation of religions,” GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&site=webhp&q=%22state+categorically+that+
this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OIC’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+
of+religions%22&oq=%22state+categorically+that+this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OI
C’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+of+religions%22 (last visited Mar. 16, 
2012). 
60 Ahmed Suleiman Ibrahim Alaquil, Saudi Arabia Ambassador to the Human Rights 
Council, Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 
24, 2011) (emphasis added), available at 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2-
eng.rm?start=00:50:10&end=00:51:42. 
61 See Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, U.S. Ambassador to the Human Rights Council, 
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24, 
2011), available at 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2-
eng.rm?start=00:54:04&end=00:58:47 (noting that the resolution only allows for punishment 
when expression incites imminent violence, but not addressing the OIC members’ claims that 
the prior resolutions remained valid).  
62 András Dékány, Permanent Representative of Hung. to the U.N. Office at Geneva, 
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (March 24, 
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Following its adoption by consensus, numerous officials and 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) lined up to applaud 
Resolution 16/18 as a death knell for defamation of religion. The 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(“USCIRF”), long critical of the OIC’s effort to install a norm 
prohibiting defamation of religion, offered an observation seemingly 
disconnected from reality: “Tragically, it took the assassinations of 
two prominent Pakistani officials who opposed that country’s 
draconian blasphemy laws . . . to convince the OIC that the annual 
defamation of religions resolutions embolden extremists rather than 
bolster religious harmony.”63 Likewise, Human Rights Watch 
ventured that the shift to combating intolerance “implicitly rejects the 
‘defamation of religions’ concept.”64  
Oddly, neither of these statements sought to account for the 
multiple reassertions of the norm’s validity expressed during the 
Council session. Perhaps more cautiously, the UN’s Special 
Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief, on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, and on Contemporary Forms of Racism 
jointly declared the adoption of Resolution 16/18 a “positive 
development.”65 During an Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (“OHCHR”)-sponsored expert workshop in Nairobi, 
Kenya, they expressed their collective appreciation that “the 
[UNHRC] has—after years of debate—ultimately found a way to 
unanimously address [the] worrying phenomena [of intolerance, 
negative stereotyping, discrimination, and incitement] without 
referring to concepts or notions that would undermine international 
human rights law.”66 At the same time, however, they “emphasize[d] 
the principle that individuals rather than religions per se are the 
                                                                                                                 
 
2011), available at 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2-
eng.rm?start=00:59:05&end=01:02:22 (speaking on behalf of the EU).  
63 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, USCIRF Welcomes Move 
Away from “Defamation of Religions” Concept (Mar. 24, 2011), http://uscirf.gov/news-
room/press-releases/3570-uscirf-welcomes-move-away-from-defamation-of-religions-
concept.html.  
64 UN: Rights Body Acts Decisively on Iran, Cote d’Ivoire, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 
25, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/25/un-rights-body-acts-decisively-iran-cote-d-
ivoire. Human Rights Watch attributed particular significance to the fact that “the new 
resolution was proposed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and adopted by 
consensus.” Id.  
65 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the 
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 8 (Apr. 6–7, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.  
66 Id. 
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rights-holders.”67 These statements were reiterated by the special 
rapporteurs in their joint submissions to the follow up OHCHR 
workshops held in Bangkok, Thailand
68
 and Santiago, Chile during 
2011.
69
 
III. LIVING IN A POST-CONSENSUS WORLD: THE WEST DREAMS 
WHILE THE OIC SCHEMES  
Despite the general fanfare and congratulatory accolades 
surrounding the consensus vote on Resolution 16/18, neither the 
content of the resolution nor the remarks of state representatives at the 
UNHRC offer anything that decisively invalidates or discredits the 
recognition of an international prohibition on defamation of religion. 
In fact, as the following sections indicate, despite the omission of the 
term “defamation of religion” from UN resolutions in 2011, the OIC 
continues to support this norm actively as a fait accompli. This 
consistent position denigrates the spirit of consensus in which the 
resolutions combatting intolerance ostensibly were passed. More 
disturbingly, this behavior may ultimately undermine the very 
objectives to which Resolution 16/18 aspires by condoning the 
continued prosecution of blasphemy-based offenses and potentially 
discrediting otherwise legitimate efforts to combat discrimination and 
incitement. 
A. The UN’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
Complementary Standards 
Following the UNHRC’s 2006 decision, the Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards embarked on a series 
of working sessions “to draw up the requisite legal instruments”70 that 
would address existing gaps in the CERD and formulate new 
                                                                                                                 
67 Id.  
68 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the 
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 12 (July 6–7, 2011) 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/expert_papers_Bangkok/
SRSubmissionBangkokWorkshop.pdf. 
69 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the 
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 (Oct. 12–13, 2011) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Santiago/JointSRSubmissionSantia
go.pdf. 
70 Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up 
to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban  Declaration and Programme of 
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007).  
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normative standards aimed at combating incitement to racial and 
religious hatred.
71
 As noted above, the OIC attempted to use this 
venue to blur the line between defamation and incitement and press 
for a new treaty prohibiting insults and ridicule of religion.
72
 In part 
because of opposition to this approach, the meetings held from 2008 
through 2010 were characterized by an overriding sense of discord 
and contention so profound that the position of Chairperson-
Rapporteur remained vacant for an extended period.
73
 But what of the 
Ad Hoc Committee’s session following the passage of Resolution 
16/18, which occurred in a new atmosphere of consensus that put 
aside the previous “false divide that pits religious sensitivities against 
freedom of expression”?74 The second part of the Ad Hoc 
Committee’s third session, which convened April 11–21, 2011, is 
instructive in this regard. 
After an abortive start to the third session and a delay of nearly six 
months, member states reconvened and agreed that Jerry Matthews 
Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa, would serve as 
chairperson-rapporteur for the committee.
75
 In turn, Matjila proposed 
four initial topics for discussion intended to reflect “burning issues of 
the times” and “key topics and concerns of participants”:76 (1) 
“xenophobia”; (2) “incitement to racial, ethnic and religious hatred”; 
(3) “racial and xenophobic acts committed through information and 
communication technologies”; and (4) “racial, ethnic and religious 
profiling.”77 Matjila suggested that the committee address incitement 
to racial, ethnic and religious hatred specifically because it “had been 
the focus of attention during recent sessions of the Human Rights 
Council, [and] . . . the Council’s last session had adopted a resolution 
by consensus and that he wished to build thereon.”78 The United 
States expressed the view that any discussion in the Ad Hoc 
Committee should reflect the new consensus language contained in 
                                                                                                                 
71 Id. ¶ (a). For additional background on the Ad Hoc Committee, see Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/adhoccommittee.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).  
72 See supra Part I.B. 
73 Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
Complementary Standards on its Third Session, ¶ 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/36 (Sept. 6, 2011) 
[hereinafter HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report]. 
74 Stephen Kaufman, Clinton Says More Effort Needed to Combat Religious Intolerance, 
IIP DIGITAL (July 15, 2011), 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/07/20110715180740nehpets0.7188227.ht
ml#axzz1o12afMnj (quoting Secretary of State Hilary Clinton). 
75 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7. 
76 Id. ¶ 15. 
77 Id. ¶ 14. 
78 Id. ¶ 16. 
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Resolution 16/18, namely “combating advocacy of national, ethnic, 
religious and racial hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.”79 But other participants 
disagreed, leaving the formal meetings bogged without consensus 
over which issues the committee should in fact address.  
In an attempt to overcome the impasse, the Ad Hoc Committee 
adjourned and shifted into “informal consultations” facilitated by 
Mothusi Bruce Rabasha Palai, the permanent representative of 
Botswana.
80
 Following these efforts, Palai reported back that “[i]n 
view of the need to keep the participants working together, topic 2 
‘Advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious 
hatred’ had been dropped.”81 According to Palai’s report, the EU 
“seemed to have major difficulty with the wording of the topic’s 
title,”82 whereas the United States reiterated its concern as being 
“more one of characterization than of reality or substance,” and 
“suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee move forward on the basis of 
[the UNHRC] consensus resolution rather than revert to previous 
terminology and focus.”83  
Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Committee could only agree to move 
forward on discussions relating to the topics of xenophobia and the 
“[e]stablishment, designation or maintaining of national mechanisms 
with competences to protect against and prevent all forms and 
manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance.”84 These discussions reveal a continuing 
overarching procedural disagreement over whether perceived gaps in 
normative standards require new treaties or protocols or can be 
addressed within existing frameworks through more effective 
implementation.
85
 Coupled with the obvious ongoing substantive 
tensions alluded to above, these factors together may help explain 
additional delays in the Ad Hoc Committee’s scheduled meetings and 
anticipated work product.
86
 The chairperson’s plea for “other regions 
                                                                                                                 
79 Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. ¶ 21. 
81 Id. ¶ 23. 
82 Id. ¶ 27. 
83 Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. ¶ 63. 
85 For example, the United States “expressed the need for practical discussions that 
focused on better implementation of existing norms, as the problem was not that there were gaps 
in the existing international legal framework, but rather that there were gaps in practical 
implementation of existing standards.” Id. ¶ 67. In contrast, the views of the OIC and the Africa 
Group held that before addressing national mechanisms, “new gaps required the elaboration of 
new standards” and “[n]ational mechanisms alone could not fill gaps and it was only logical to 
set norms first.” Id. ¶¶ 71–72. This underlying dispute led the EU to observe that “the Ad Hoc 
Committee appeared to be at a standstill again . . . .” Id. ¶ 85. 
86 The Ad Hoc Committee’s fourth session was postponed from late 2011 to April 2012. 
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to consider if they were now ready to take on the responsibility of 
serving as Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee” may also have a 
role in the delay.
87
 
The UNHRC’s review of Ad Hoc Committee’s progress provides 
additional insight into the status of the “consensus” reached in 
Resolution 16/18. During a general debate addressing the Ad Hoc 
Committee’s third report held in September 2011,88 Pakistan, on 
behalf of the OIC, explained that Resolution 16/18 was  
an attempt by the OIC to build consensus on an issue of vital 
importance . . . by identifying ways and means to deal with 
the growing problem of religious intolerance and 
discrimination, and incitement to hatred and violence based 
on religion. However, as projected by some, it is important to 
emphasize that resolution 16/18 did not replace the OIC’s 
earlier resolutions on combating defamation of religions 
which were adopted by the Human Rights Council and 
continue to remain valid.
89
  
From the OIC’s perspective, then, it would be perfectly legitimate for 
the Ad Hoc Committee to consider and propose a new treaty or 
protocol addressing defamation of religion in the context of 
incitement to religious hatred. In support of this understanding, the 
representative from Kuwait reasoned that the “constitution of the state 
of Kuwait is in conformity with the rules and regulations of human 
rights conventions” and thus, “[l]egally, it is not allowed to express 
any opinion that includes scorn or that degrades or demeans any faith 
                                                                                                                 
 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary 
Standards on its Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/78 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
87 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶ 108. 
88 See Human Rights Council Holds General Debate on Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11441&LangID=E 
(providing testimony in an unofficial form).  
89 Saeed Sarwar, Draft Statement by Pakistan, on Behalf of the OIC Member States, 
During General Debate Under Agenda Item 9 During the 18th Session of the Human Rights 
Council (Geneva, 27 September 2011), 2, 
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
1%20Pakistan%20%28OIC%29%2031.pdf (password protected). Similar to remarks offered 
before adoption of Resolution 16/18, the U.S. statement delivered during the general debate 
does not contradict the OIC assertion concerning defamation of religion. See Emily Narkis, 
Remarks Delivered on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of 
Intolerance, Follow-Up and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
Action at the Human Rights Council 18th Session (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
5%20United%20States%2031.pdf (password protected).  
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or religion . . . be it in challenging the beliefs or the teachings and 
traditions. This applies [to] all religions without naming one 
religion.”90 Likewise, the Moroccan delegate stressed the importance 
of the Ad Hoc Committee’s work and associated its own position with 
that of the OIC and Africa Group.
91
 
B. OIC Resolutions and Other Activities 
Despite the ostensible existence of a new consensus view on 
incitement at the UN, delegates to the UNHRC cannot be faulted for 
insisting on the continued legitimacy of defamation of religion within 
in the Council and elsewhere. In reality, these government officials 
are merely restating another consensus—yet contradictory—view 
maintained by the OIC that continues to “call upon the international 
community to take effective measures to combat the defamation of 
religions . . . .”92 Indeed, the resolutions emerging from the OIC’s 
most recent Council of Foreign Ministers—which followed months 
after the unanimous UNHRC endorsement of Resolution 16/18—
plainly establish that securing a prohibition against defamation of 
religion remains one of the organization’s overriding objectives, 
despite any “historic”93 UN consensus relating to incitement. 
For example, Resolution No. 34/38-POL On Combating 
Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against Islam 
generally “[r]eaffirm[s] all OIC resolutions, which stress, inter alia, 
the need for effectively combating defamation of Islam and 
incitement to religious hatred, hostility, violence and discrimination 
against Islam and Muslims, as well as the growing trend of 
Islamophobia.”94 More specifically, the resolution affirms the OIC’s 
commitment to securing a prohibition against defamation that applies 
                                                                                                                 
90 Haya Al-Duraie, Kuwait Ambassador to Human Rights Council, Remarks at 18th 
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/kuwait-item-9-general-debate-31st-plenary-
meeting.html.  
91 Omar Rabi, Morocco Ambassador to the Human Rights Council, Remarks at the 18th 
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/morocco-item-9-clustered-id-on-racism-30th-
plenary-meeting.html.  
92 OIC, OIC Astana Declaration: Peace, Cooperation and Development, ¶ 16, O.I.C. Doc. 
OIC/CFM-38/2011/ASTANA DEC/FINAL (June 30, 2011). 
93 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks: 
Promoting Respect and Tolerance for International Religious Freedom (Sept. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/172232.htm. 
94 OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against 
Islam, OIC Res. No. 34/38-POL, compiled in Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 75, O.I.C. Doc. 
OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June 28–30, 2011) (emphasis removed) [hereinafter OIC Res. 
34/38-POL]. The resolution expresses “the firm determination of Member States to continue 
their effective cooperation and close consultations” to this end. Id. at 76, § 1. 
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exclusively to so-called “divine religions”95 and categorically links 
defamation with blasphemy by condemning “all blasphemous acts 
against Islamic principles, symbols and sacred personalities” and “all 
abhorrent and irresponsible statements about Islam and its sacred 
personalities.”96  
The resolution’s provisions notably omit any consideration of the 
deleterious impact of existing anti-blasphemy measures in OIC 
member states and elsewhere.
97
 But perhaps most starkly at odds with 
the fanfare surrounding the UNHRC’s consensus on combating 
incitement, the OIC resolution calls upon all states “to prevent any . . . 
defamation of Islam by incorporating legal and administrative 
measures which render defamation illegal and punishable by law.”98 
Drawing on the OIC’s position in the UNHRC Ad Hoc Committee, 
the resolution calls for “a legally binding international instrument to 
prevent intolerance, discrimination, prejudice and hatred on the 
grounds of religion, and defamation of religions . . . .”99  
If the OIC’s commitment to advancing a prohibition on defamation 
of religion still appears ambivalent or otherwise displaced by the 
consensus vote at the UNHRC, Resolution 34/38-POL cements the 
OIC’s position by establishing an annual reporting requirement 
intended to cover “defamatory acts against Islam or its sacred 
personalities.”100 And it maintains the defamation issue as an item 
agenda for the 39th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
101
 
Similarly, Resolution 35/38-POL, expressly addressing 
“Combating Defamation of Religions” also reaffirms previous UN 
resolutions on defamation of religion, and  
[e]mphasiz[es] that the consistent pattern of safe passage of 
the resolution, by a majority vote beyond OIC membership, 
lends recognition and international legitimacy to the urgent 
need to combat defamation of religions.
102
 
To undergird this position, the OIC elsewhere calls for “the non-
use of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the 
                                                                                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id. § 5. 
97 See infra Part IV.C (discussing numerous instances of anti-blasphemy laws being used 
by OIC member states to infringe on freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief). 
98 OIC Res. 34/38-POL, supra note 94, at 77, § 9. 
99 Id. § 12 (quotations omitted). The resolution also established an “open-ended 
Intergovernmental Group of Legal an[d] Political Experts to develop and examine the legal and 
political elements of such an instrument.” Id. at 78, § 13. 
100 Id. § 16. 
101 Id. § 18. 
102 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 79 (emphasis removed). 
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states’ internal affairs and diminish their national sovereignty.”103 
Together with this, the OIC also asserts that western states have a 
responsibility to “ensure full respect to Islam and all divine religions” 
and must reject the use of “freedom of expression or press as a pretext 
to defame religions.”104 Arguably, these assertions may reflect no 
more than rhetorical declarations. Resolution 35/38-POL, however, 
also mandates very practical steps for advancing efforts to secure a 
prohibition against defamation by, among other things, intensifying 
efforts to coordinate positions and broaden the support base in favor 
of defamation resolutions “including through . . . possibilities of 
reciprocal arrangements with other groups and states.”105 The 
resolution also recommends specific activities be undertaken by the 
OIC Secretary General.
106
  
This political and legal maneuvering in turn begs the question: 
How does the OIC reconcile its business-as-usual marching orders 
concerning an international prohibition on defamation of religion with 
the consensus mandate espoused by Resolution 16/18 and celebrated 
by government and NGO officials alike? To help answer this 
question, the OIC’s 2011 resolutions provide two critical pieces of 
information. First, the organization offers no more than a passing 
acknowledgement of the so-called historic UNHRC resolution. And 
even then, the reference is couched in classically tepid diplomatic 
parlance that merely takes note of “the adoption by consensus of the 
HRC resolution 16/18.”107 But beyond this lukewarm endorsement, 
the OIC more tellingly “[u]rges all Member States to continue to 
support the [defamation of religion] resolution on bloc . . . while 
exploring alternative approaches, including the one contained in the 
HRC resolution 16/18.”108 From this perspective, the resolution 
                                                                                                                 
103 OIC, On Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/38-
Leg, compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, at 4, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-
38/2011/LEG/RES (June 28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg]; see also OIC, On 
Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg, at 1, § 5, 
compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/LEG/RES.FINAL 
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg] (emphasis removed) (“Calls for the 
non-use of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the states’ internal affairs 
and undermine their national sovereignty.”). 
104 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 8; see also id. at 5, § 10 (similarly 
reaffirming “the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common policy aimed at preventing 
defamation of Islam perpetrated under the pretext and justification of the freedom of expression 
in particular through media and Internet”). 
105 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 82, § 14. 
106 Id. § 16. 
107 Id. § 14. The preamble of this resolution “[r]eaffirm[s] the OIC sponsored resolutions 
on combating defamation of religions adopted by the Human Rights Council and the United 
Nations General Assembly” and then “[a]lso reaffirm[s] the OIC sponsored resolution 16/18.” 
Id. at 79 (emphasis removed). 
108 Id. at 82, § 15. 
 4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM 
372 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
ostensibly responsible for putting an end to “divisive debate” at the 
UN is no more than a distraction, an alternative approach to securing 
the OIC’s unaffected top priority—an international prohibition 
against speech deemed critical or insulting of Islam, or at the very 
least, international validation for the continued prosecution of 
blasphemy offenses at home. 
That this objective remains a “top priority” is confirmed not only 
in the text of the OIC resolution on combating defamation of 
religion,
109
 but also in the organization’s steadfast commitment to the 
subject even in the face of seemingly more urgent matters. For 
example, a survey of issues addressed at the OIC Annual 
Coordination Meeting held in September 2011, and illustrated in the 
below table, indicates that defamation of religion received more 
consideration than developments in Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and 
Iraq combined.
110
 In fact, the only issue that garnered more attention 
than defamation was the OIC’s perennial concern with the Arab-
Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflict—an issue inextricably linked to the 
organization’s establishment in 1969.111  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. § 17. 
110 OIC, Final Communique of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the OIC Member States, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ACM-2011/FC (Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 
OIC, Final Communique].  
111 Ishtiaq Ahmad, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: From Ceremonial Politics 
Towards Politicization?, in BEYOND REGIONALISM?: REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGIONALISM 
AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 125, 125 (Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi eds., 
2008). 
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Table: Issues Addressed by OIC Annual Coordination Meeting 
Final Communiqué 2011 
 
Rank Issue 
Total # of Paragraphs 
(Paragraph #s) 
1 
Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict  
(express references only) 
12 (¶¶ 5–11, 13–15, 45, 
& 54) 
2 
Defamation of religion, 
Islamophobia, & incitement to 
racial and religious hatred 
10 (¶¶ 54–63) 
3 Terrorism 6 (¶¶ 39–44) 
3 
UN reform (including OIC voting at 
the UN relating expressly to, inter 
alia, defamation of religion)
112
 
6 (¶¶ 64–69) 
4 
Nuclear weapons/energy, 
disarmament & non-proliferation 
5 (¶¶ 45–49) 
5 Jammu and Kashmir 4 (¶¶ 20–23) 
6 Libya 4 (¶¶ 26–29) 
7 Somalia 2 (¶¶ 25 & 33) 
7 Kosovo 2 (¶¶ 30–31) 
8 Azerbaijan 1 (¶ 18) 
8 Cyprus 1 (¶ 19) 
8 Iraq 1 (¶ 32) 
8 Muslims in Greece 1 (¶ 34) 
8 Sudan 1 (¶ 35) 
8 Yemen 1 (¶ 36) 
8 Djibouti  1 (¶ 37) 
8 Afghanistan 1 (¶ 38) 
8 Syrian crisis (Arab Spring) 1 (¶ 15) 
 
This ranking indicates that UNHRC Resolution 16/18 failed to 
persuade the OIC that defamation of religion needed to be shelved or 
abandoned. An EU-sponsored review of the UNHRC that predates 
adoption of Resolution 16/18 confirms that the OIC’s agenda 
priorities remain unchanged, even in a “post-consensus” era. 
                                                                                                                 
112 See also OIC, On Coordination and Voting Patterns of Member States at the United 
Nations and Other International and Multilateral Fora, Res. No. 41/37-POL, compiled in 
Resolutions on Political Issues, at 99, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/POL/RES//FINAL 
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL] (emphasis added) (“Calls on Member 
States to further enhance their [UN] cooperation and coordination, and adopt unified positions 
and voting patterns . . . that advance the objectives and principles of the OIC and interests of the 
Islamic world, including those that relate to combating Islamophobia, the defamation of 
religions, and peaceful settlement of conflicts.”). The 2011 final communiqué “urge[s] Member 
States to implement [this] Resolution . . . .” OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 67. 
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According to the report, “[a]lmost all of the OIC resolutions in 
regular sessions concern Israeli violations of human rights, or 
defamation of religions.”113 
In addition to illuminating the OIC’s top priorities, the 2011 Final 
Communique is also instructive insofar as it confirms the OIC’s 
framing of UNHRC Resolution 16/18 as merely a stepping-stone on 
the path to an international prohibition of defamation of religion. The 
Communique specifically lauds the OIC Groups in New York and 
Geneva for placing the “crucial” issue of “incitement to racial and 
religious hatred, in particular, its contemporary manifestation—i.e. 
the defamation of religions, at the top of the permanent agenda of the 
General Assembly and the HRC.”114 The statement then proceeds to: 
(1) “emphasize[] the need to develop, at the United Nations, including 
the Human Rights Council, a legally binding international instrument 
to promote respect for all religions”;115 (2) “stress[] the need to 
prevent the abuse of freedom of expression and freedom of press for 
insulting Islam and other divine religions”;116 and finally (3) urge 
Member States to implement OIC Resolution 41/37-POL,
117
 which 
stated their commitment to vote as a bloc at the UN on OIC 
objectives, “including those that relate to combating Islamophobia 
[and] the defamation of religions . . . .”118  
The significance of both the OIC drive in favor of bloc voting and 
its impact on UN affairs is worth underscoring in the context of 
Resolution 16/18 and any future action on the questions of incitement 
and defamation. The EU’s 2011 report on the UNHRC observes that 
“the Africa Group often seems to be working in conjunction with the 
OIC—and frequently OIC members will speak on behalf of the Africa 
Group. The OIC’s concerns have thus been dominating the HRC’s 
discussions and outcomes.”119 As an outgrowth of the pervasiveness 
of ‘bloc politics’ within the HRC, “moderate states in blocs opposing 
the EU often find it more attractive to go along with the OIC or the 
Africa Group or the NAM [Non Aligned Movement] than to resist the 
peer pressure and vote with the EU.”120 More distressingly, the 
                                                                                                                 
113 The European Union and the Review of the Human Rights Council, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
PE 433.870, at 13 (2011). 
114 OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 54 (emphasis added). 
115 Id. ¶ 59. 
116 Id. ¶ 61. 
117 Id. ¶ 67. 
118 OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL, supra note 112, at 99, § 5.  
119 EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 433.870, supra note 113, at 13. This phenomenon is confirmed by 
the Africa Group’s position within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Complementary 
Standards. See supra Part I.B.  
120 Id. at 15. 
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pattern of response to this bloc voting has been colored by a 
“prevailing view . . . that the EU should avoid ‘losing’ and therefore 
should not run . . . resolutions that may not attract a consensus.”121 As 
a consequence, the report finds that EU ambitions in the UNHRC 
have been distinctly lowered. Rather than propose and pursue its own 
resolutions,
122
 the EU approach is characterized by a shift away “quite 
considerably from its initial position” in favor of “‘going for 
consensus.’”123 Although this tactic may generate the appearance of 
unanimity within the Council, it does little to address the report’s 
underlying conclusion that consensus-seeking behavior may 
ultimately harm “the cause of promoting and protecting human 
rights.”124 In this respect, Resolution 16/18 and its outgrowth is a case 
in point. 
C. The Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Anyone for Jenga? 
On the heels of the 38th session of the OIC’s Council of Foreign 
Ministers, the OIC and United States co-hosted in Istanbul, Turkey, a 
high-level ministerial meeting intended to facilitate Resolution 
16/18’s implementation. The event, which gathered representatives 
from key states and international organizations, ended with a feeble 
joint statement “call[ing] upon all relevant stakeholders throughout 
the world to take seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution 
16/18.”125 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton separately remarked:  
[T]ogether we have begun to overcome the false divide that 
pits religious sensitivities against freedom of expression, and 
we are pursuing a new approach based on concrete steps to 
fight intolerance wherever it occurs. Under [Resolution 
16/18], the international community is taking a strong stand 
                                                                                                                 
121 Id. at 12–13. The report also noted:  
The EU’s isolation is evident in the voting records of the Human Rights Council. 
While most resolutions in the HRC are approved by consensus, roll-call votes are 
held on the most contentious issues. In the first fifteen regular sessions, there were a 
total of 89 roll-call votes. In 64 of them (72%), EU member states were in the 
minority.  
Id. at 14. 
122 Id. at 13. 
123 Id. at 18. 
124 Id. 
125 Joint Statement on Combating Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on 
Religion or Belief, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Jul. 15, 2011), 
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719041927244.html. 
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for freedom of expression and worship, and against 
discrimination and violence based upon religion or belief.
126
 
To further advance this new approach, the United States 
announced the “Istanbul Process,” a series of expert level meetings 
intended to “operationalize[e] the text of HRC Resolution 16/18 . . . 
[and] turn our energies to seeking real and effective measures against 
bigotry, discrimination, and violence on the basis of religion or belief 
in the ways spelled out in Resolution 16/18, which are fully consistent 
with freedom of expression.”127  
The first of these meetings was held behind closed doors over 
three days in late December 2011 in Washington DC. The meeting 
focused on the twin themes of identifying methods to better enforce 
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or belief and 
exploring government strategies to engage religious minorities, 
including religious and cultural awareness training for government 
officials.
128
 Although not in attendance, OIC Secretary General 
Ihsanoglu sent a message to the meeting participants, reiterating 
verbatim the remarks he offered several months earlier in Istanbul: 
The importance of the consensual adoption of [Resolution 
16/18] cannot be overemphasized. . . . 
. . . . 
Let me say that it reaffirmed OIC’s credibility as well as 
demonstrated ability to seek, promote and build consensus on 
even the most sensitive of issues in contemporary 
international relations. It clearly demonstrated that, as a 
mature International Organization, OIC was not wedded to 
either a particular title or the content of a resolution. We just 
wanted to ensure that the actual matter of vital concern and 
interest to OIC Member states was addressed.
129
 
                                                                                                                 
126 Clinton, supra note 9.  
127 U.S. Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55, 
at 2.  
128 Cook, supra note 13; see also Agenda, Istanbul Process For Combating Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Dec. 12–14, 2011 (on file with the author). 
129 OIC Secretary General, Message to the Washington Meeting on the Istanbul Process 
(Dec. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20111215123907595.html. This message is a repeat 
of the one offered at the outset of the ministerial meeting held in Istanbul on July 15, 2011. See 
OIC, Statement of HE Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the OIC Secretary General, at the 
Ministerial Meeting, held on 15 July 2011 at the IRCICA in Istanbul-Turkey (July 19, 2011), 
www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719042534728.html. 
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It is difficult to reconcile this statement with those promulgated by 
OIC representatives and others in the lead up to voting on Resolution 
16/18. Yet more egregiously, when contextualized against the flurry 
of OIC activity both internally and at the UN reasserting the 
organization’s commitment to securing a prohibition against 
perceived criticism and insult of religious ideas and beliefs, the 
Secretary General’s assertion that the OIC is not wed to content 
appears dubious at best. 
For its part, the U.S. Department of State has announced its 
intention to compile “a comprehensive report based on discussions 
[from the December meetings] outlining a set of recommendations 
and best practices to be submitted to the [OHCHR] for public 
distribution.”130 But confronted with the OIC’s seemingly 
contradictory positions, one must wonder what value such 
recommendations will have in developing a genuinely consensual 
vision for combating religious intolerance while upholding religious 
freedom and freedom of expression. Indeed, the quest for concrete 
implementation standards will likely prove to be a Jenga moment for 
Resolution 16/18. By failing to decisively invalidate the chimera of 
defamation of religion, the UN has allowed the OIC to advocate its 
continued legality, including by openly asserting that implementation 
of Resolution 16/18 is one possible “alternative approach” to 
achieving the end goal of shielding religious beliefs from criticism 
and insult. Against this backdrop, international negotiations aimed at 
identifying implementation tools and practices will likely be subject 
to significant pressure, particularly with respect to key terms 
enshrined in Resolution 16/18.  
Although international law does provide some guidance, such as 
ICCPR Article 20, which suffers from underdeveloped consideration, 
the ongoing activity of the UNHRC Ad Hoc Committee and the 
OIC’s unaltered position signal the persistence of radically divergent 
opinions. In this vein, discrepancies and nuances over parsing what 
constitutes incitement, advocacy, discrimination, hostility, religious 
hatred, denigration, negative religious stereotyping, and imminent 
violence may generate three possible outcomes: (1) promulgated 
international implementation standards that omit precise definitions 
for key terms but retain consensus support; (2) a complete public 
breakdown in negotiations or a contentious roll call vote on 
implementation standards where consensus over specific terms cannot 
be reached; or (3) the parties may opt in favor of death by committee, 
                                                                                                                 
130 U.S. Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55, 
at 2. 
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where consensus over specific terms cannot be reached, resulting in 
no public follow up by the UNHRC on implementation standards.  
In the first scenario, national authorities are left to fill in the 
blanks, allowing for operationalization of Resolution 16/18 that 
facilitates subjective interpretation and measures that continue to 
protect select religious beliefs at the expense of freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion or belief. Here, the OIC will be 
quick to point to its consistent understanding that while “human rights 
are universal in nature,” any consideration must “bear[] in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”131 In the second case, 
where negotiations suffer a public breakdown, the OIC’s hand is 
similarly strengthened insofar as its member states are left free to 
invoke both consensus Resolution 16/18 and previous defamation of 
religion resolutions as valid bases for redoubling efforts intended to 
prohibit defamation of religion. A roll call vote on implementation 
standards likewise leaves Resolution 16/18 intact and, given the 
current makeup of the UNHRC, seems unlikely to endorse any norms 
that contradict OIC objectives. Under the third scenario, the parties 
may, in the spirit of consensus, “agree to disagree” and in turn opt to 
bury international implementation standards rather than spark another 
“divisive debate.” That outcome would similarly empower national 
authorities to superimpose a subjective interpretation on Resolution 
16/18, including a linkage between it and previous defamation of 
religion resolutions. This linkage, in turn, would ostensibly validate 
domestic measures limiting perceived criticism or insult of select 
religious beliefs as comporting with international law. 
IV. MOVING FORWARD 
In November 2011, the UN’s Third Committee approved a 
consensus resolution mostly mirroring UNHRC Resolution 16/18.
132
 
Human Rights First (“HRF”) called the Third Committee text “a 
decisive break from the polarizing focus in the past on defamation of 
religions.”133 Speaking after its adoption, the representative from the 
                                                                                                                 
131 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 1; see also OIC Res. No 1/37-Leg, 
supra note 103, at 1 (recognizing the importance of promoting human rights while taking into 
account various historical and cultural backgrounds). 
132 Social, Humanitarian & Cultural—Third Committee Res. 66/69(b), U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/66/L.47/Rev.1 (Nov. 11, 2011). One notable distinction requires the Secretary-General to 
prepare “a report on steps taken by States to combat intolerance, negative stereotyping, 
stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons, based on 
religion or belief.” Id. at 5, § 10. 
133 Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. Third Committee Makes Decisive Break from 
“Defamation of Religion” (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/11/15/u-n-
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United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), on behalf of the OIC, again 
emphasized that the resolution was inexorably linked to prior 
resolutions addressing defamation of religion.
134
 Alongside this, the 
most recent issue of OIC Journal affirmed for its readers that 
incitement to religious hatred and defamation of religion are 
indistinguishable: “Resolution 16/18 signifies an alternative and 
consensual approach towards dealing with the issue of ‘defamation of 
religions’ or incitement to hatred on religious grounds with a view to 
addressing vital concerns of all parties on this important issue.”135 
Despite the OIC’s very public and consistent assertion that 
defamation of religion remains valid and the organization’s express 
intent to continue advocating its formal adoption, the UNGA moved 
to adopt the Third Committee’s resolution one month later in 
December 2011, again without a vote.
136
 In an effort to counter 
“commonly expressed concerns”137 challenging the wisdom of the 
UNGA vote and the unfolding Istanbul Process,
138
 HRF sought to 
                                                                                                                 
 
third-committee-makes-decisive-break-from-%E2%80%9Cdefamation-of-
religion%E2%80%9D/. HRF also heralded Resolution 16/18 as a fresh start which “charted a 
new course” by focusing on the protection of the rights of individuals rather than the protection 
of abstract ideas and religions. Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. General Assembly 
Urged to Combat Intolerance, Respect Free Expression (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/10/21/u-n-general-assembly-urged-to-combat-
intolerance-respect-free-expression/. 
134 See Press Release, General Assembly, Third Committee, Text Recommending 
Adoption of Protocol to Child Rights Convention Establishing Communications Procedure for 
Individual Complaints Approved by Third Committee; 13 Other Texts Approved on Such Issues 
as Combating Religious Intolerance, Disabilities Convention, Human Rights Learning, Human 
Rights Council Report, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4029 (Nov. 15, 2011) (“[The consensus] 
was a very positive development . . . which also complemented other General Assembly 
resolutions.”).  
135 ‘Istanbul Process’ Continues: UN Resolution 16/18 Sets on an Implementation 
Framework in Washington, OIC J., Sept.–Dec. 2011, at 48, 48. 
136 G.A. Res. 66/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/167 (Dec. 19, 2011); see also Press Release, 
General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts More Than 60 Resolutions Recommended by 
Third Committee, Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in 
Syria, U.N. Press Release GA/11198 (Dec. 19, 2011) (announcing the adoption of the 
resolution); Resolutions: 66th Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/66/resolutions.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (listing resolutions 
adopted by the 66th session of the General Assembly).  
137 See Joëlle Fiss, U.N. Tackles Religious Intolerance Without Limiting Free Speech, 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/12/20/the-u-s-is-
not-opening-the-door-to-limiting-freedom-of-speech/ (responding to certain concerns over the 
U.N. resolution on combating religious intolerance). 
138 Conservative critics have most vocally raised these concerns. See, e.g., Soeren Kern, 
U.S., E.U. Spearhead Islamic Bid to Criminalize Free Speech, STONEGATE INST. (Jan. 6, 2012, 
5:00 AM), http://www.stonegateinstitute.org/2734/criminalize-free-speech (criticizing the 
Obama administration for giving the OIC political legitimacy); Joseph Klein, The Obama 
Administration’s Islamist Whitewashing Campaign, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://frontpagemag.com/2011/12/21/the-obama-administrations-islamist-whitewashing-
campaign/ (criticizing the Obama administration for submitting to the OIC’s wishes); Nina 
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rebut several “myths” related to U.S. engagement with Muslim 
states. One of these myths, according to HRF, posits that if “[t]he 
OIC has not abandoned the concept of defamation of religions . . . 
why bother organizing [the Istanbul Process] if its agenda hasn’t 
changed?”139 Acknowledging that defamation of religion “has not 
vanished into thin air” and that blasphemy laws “continue to abuse 
human rights,” HRF downplayed the sustained effort to preserve 
defamation of religion’s legitimacy by loosely observing that “[a]t 
the international level . . . certain leaders have not abandoned 
reference to defamation of religions.”140 This casual assessment 
neglects the scope and consistency of the OIC’s multiple 
statements and resolutions that followed on the heels of Resolution 
16/18. Moreover, it recklessly ignores the immediate connection 
that the OIC continues to draw between previous defamation of 
religion resolutions and the consensus resolutions of 2011.  
Ultimately, HRF’s “myth” and “reality” misses the point. While it 
may be fair to question the practicality of dialogue, the larger concern 
should be whether the Istanbul Process can realistically offer a 
framework for progress given the potential for manipulation outlined 
above, as well as the failure to decisively reject the defamation of 
religion chimera. We ignore these shortcomings in the international 
consensus at the peril of religious dissenters, religious minorities, 
nonbelievers, artists, academics, journalists, and others who seek to 
exercise their rights to free expression and freedom of religion in 
accordance with existing international norms. It therefore behooves 
governments and other communities concerned with the protection of 
these rights to stop dutifully validating the consensus approach 
without taking critical stock of the process to date. To facilitate this 
undertaking, and in the context of the findings presented herein, the 
author proposes some general suggestions below.  
A. Resolve to Categorically Invalidate Defamation of Religion 
Perhaps the single largest obstacle to genuine international 
progress toward combatting intolerance is the UN’s failure to reject 
                                                                                                                 
 
Shea, A Perverse ‘Process’: Hillary’s Free-Speech Follies, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 10:15 
PM) (calling on US diplomats to stop the “Istanbul Process”); see also Jonathan Turley, 
Criminalizing Intolerance, Op-Ed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011. 
139 Fiss, supra note 137. 
140 Id. Fiss goes on to suggest that “[t]his requires continued vigilance on the part of the US 
and like-minded governments, as well as human rights and other civil society groups, to ensure 
that the momentum remains on the side of the new consensus approach.” Id. 
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decisively the concept of defamation of religion. This failure ensures 
that the idea remains an albatross to any parallel or consensus 
process. This is particularly true when certain states, most notably 
OIC members, continue to invoke prior UN resolutions on this topic 
unchallenged as valid normative standards for protecting select 
religious beliefs. This overarching problem is exacerbated by the 
decision to sidestep the stark confrontation over defamation of 
religion in favor of an approach premised on inadequately defined 
norms that provide a sufficiently vague platform for achieving 
consensus. The new consensus approach has effectively shut down 
the debate over an underlying and unresolved fundamental dispute. 
And it has effectively moved the debate to an area where states are 
poised to reformulate the same insidious practices under the guise of 
the decidedly more admirable objective of combatting intolerance. 
Pressing the international community to implement norms for 
combatting intolerance under these circumstances potentially risks 
accommodating the same goals sought by defamation of religion.  
More troubling, the consensus approach complicates the task of 
identifying problematic practices because it shifts the debate from one 
characterized by distinct bright lines to a more nuanced and 
subjective framework that leaves greater maneuvering room for 
justifying discrimination and limitations of rights. This loss of clarity 
is problematic not only from a rights perspective, but from an 
engagement perspective as well. Saying that international law 
prohibits protecting religious beliefs from insult is a more 
straightforward proposition than saying international law rejects a 
national legislature or judiciary’s interpretation of what constitutes 
incitement, or for that matter, imminent violence. Thus, identifying 
and countering instances of abusive implementation of measures 
intended to combat intolerance becomes decidedly more complicated. 
This potential fallout underscores why the Istanbul Process augurs 
such little promise and in fact may further facilitate human rights 
abuses. 
To counteract this deleterious path, progress on the Istanbul 
Process must be monitored closely. Discussions regarding the scope 
of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights necessarily 
dictate transparency.
141
 At a minimum, this requires opening future 
proceedings to outside participation and scrutiny from NGOs, 
journalists, academics and other concerned parties. Based on 
                                                                                                                 
141 Recall that the Washington DC round of the Istanbul Process was “closed-door.” Josef 
Kuhn, ‘The Istanbul Process’: Hillary Clinton Hosts Summit on Religious Intolerance,  
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/15/istanbul-process-clinton_n_1152508.html.  
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whatever progress may be achieved for identifying means of 
implementing Resolution 16/18 through the Istanbul Process, any 
future UN resolution enshrining such norms should include operative 
language clearly invalidating previous defamation of religion 
resolutions as well as any other attempts to introduce similar norms 
intended to shield religious beliefs from criticism.
142
 Admittedly, the 
extent to which this is a feasible option is certainly open to debate. 
Nevertheless, rejection of the defamation of religion concept must be 
a prerequisite to any further advancement because it affords the only 
authoritative means by which the specter of defamation of religion 
can be prevented from contaminating genuine efforts aimed at 
combatting incitement.
143
 To this end, there are several steps that can 
be taken that build on earlier successes in lowering the numerical 
majority voting in favor of defamation of religion resolutions. 
B. Assertive Engagement on Constitutional and Legislative Reform 
The Arab Spring revolutions can figure prominently in engaging 
individual OIC member states. While many of these new 
governments are emerging as decidedly Islamic in orientation, they 
are also entering a world where human rights commitments are 
increasingly important. Any extension of diplomatic and political 
support and recognition, trade benefits, and aid (in the form of 
financial and other assistance) should require the endorsement and 
adoption of international human rights standards, not only in new 
constitutions, but also in legislative reform that the post-revolution 
era necessitates. Therefore, in addition to monitoring constitutional 
and legislative change in countries in transition, the international 
community should create opportunities for concrete engagement, 
particularly regarding how these new governments intend to address 
the challenge of combatting intolerance, as well as enshrine and 
uphold international human rights.  
                                                                                                                 
142 As this Article goes to press, no progress on agreed implementation norms has been 
made. Instead, the UNHRC’s nineteenth session in March 2012 approved by consensus a 
resolution on combating intolerance that reiterates almost verbatim Resolution 16/18, without 
any supplemental reference to implementation. Human Rights Council Res. 19/…, Combating 
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to 
Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, 19th Sess., Mar. 23, 2012, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.7 (Mar. 16, 2012). 
143 There is at least one precedent at the UN concerning revocation of previous resolutions. 
Consider the 1991 UNGA decision to cancel its infamous Resolution 3379 from sixteen years 
earlier, which purported to brand Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination. The one-
line resolution simply provided that the UNGA “[d]ecides to revoke the determination 
contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.” G.A. Res. 46/86, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/46/86 (Dec. 16, 1991). Arguably, a more explicit rejection of the defamation of religion 
norm that provides additional context and justification could be negotiated. 
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International recognition of these new governments and 
endorsements of legitimacy should not be extended as a matter of 
course. A useful starting point is the EU’s decision to condition 
diplomatic recognition of post-Soviet states inter alia on the provision 
of legal “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities”144 Yet, already the international community appears 
poised to place inadequate emphasis on the importance of 
concretizing rights in emerging constitutional texts.
145
 For example, 
Libya’s Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage, 
provides that “Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal 
source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia).”146 While the 
maintenance of an established state religion is not per se incompatible 
with international human rights law, such official recognition must 
not result in any impairment of recognized rights, ‘‘nor in any 
discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-
believers.”147 With this in mind, the text fails to elaborate on key 
questions including whose interpretation of sharia shall govern during 
the transitional period, to whom shall sharia be applied, or what will 
occur in the event of conflicts between sharia and international law. 
To this end, Article 7, which provides that “[h]uman rights and his 
basic freedoms shall be respected . . . . [and that] [t]he state shall 
endeavor to join the international and regional declarations and 
charters which protect such rights and freedoms,”148 leaves significant 
room for improvement.  
Similarly, statements of western officials do not go far enough in 
establishing a minimum expectation for enshrining international 
                                                                                                                 
144 European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1485, 1487 (1992). 
145 One comparative constitutional scholar recently writing about the unfolding drafting 
process omitted any mention of an international role in the process or the importance of 
incorporating strong protection for fundamental human rights. Tom Ginsburg, Libya’s New 
Constitution: Lessons from Iraq’s Missteps, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2011. Earlier observations by 
Ginsburg gloss over the issue of rights and focus instead on governance structure. See Tom 
Ginsburg, Thoughts on the Draft Transitional Constitution for Libya, 
CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:23 AM), 
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/08/thoughts-on-draft-transitional.html 
(discussing the importance of governance structure); see also Catherine Ashton, EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Sec’y Policy and Vice President of the European 
Comm’n, Speech at the Libya Women’s Rights Forum (Nov. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_11579_fr.htm (emphasizing the importance of 
political rights for women).  
146 The Transitional Nat’l Council of Libya, Draft Constitutional Charter for the 
Transitional Stage, AL-BAB.COM, art. 1, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/libya/Libya-Draft-
Constitutional-Charter-for-the-Transitional-Stage.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).  
147 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: Article 18: The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion, ¶ 9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993). 
148 Draft Constitutional Charter, supra note 146, at art. 7. 
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human rights norms in emerging constitutions and state practice. For 
example, in July 2011 Secretary of State Clinton said, “In Egypt and 
Tunisia, we hope to see minorities brought into the process of drafting 
a new constitution and given a seat at the table as new democracies 
take shape.”149 This timid stance is meager support for those favoring 
reforms in line with international human rights norms, and does 
precious little to motivate other relevant actors to forgo advocacy of 
illegitimate limits on freedom of expression, including support for a 
prohibition on “defamation of religions”.150 Indeed, several months 
later, Egypt’s constitution drafting committee is in disarray, faced 
with charges that some Islamists have sought to hamper the voices of 
more moderate Egyptian Muslims, Coptic Christians, and secularists, 
among others. Following a walkout by over 20 committee delegates 
representative of these minority groups, an administrative court 
moved to suspend the 100-member committee pending a review of 
the process surrounding its formation.
151
  
Building on the EU’s post-Cold War approach, therefore, the 
international community should be prepared to “up the ante”. It must 
develop a diplomatic strategy that moves beyond previously accepted 
constraints on engagement in a transparent and straightforward 
manner. As recent case studies, Afghanistan and Iraq offer scant 
evidence to support perpetuating the “hands off” approach that 
prevailed in those constitutional drafting experiences.
152
 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                 
149 Clinton, supra note 9. 
150 See Tunisia: Affirm Human Rights in New Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 
20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/tunisia-affirm-human-rights-new-constitution 
(noting that a questionnaire that surveyed Tunisian political parties found that those parties 
“disagree on limits to freedom of expression when it concerns the right to privacy, the 
protection of minorities against hate speech, and the “‘defamation of religions’”). 
151 Bradley Hope, Egyptian constitution committee suspended, THE NATIONAL (Abu 
Dhabi), Apr 11, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/egyptian-constitution-
committee-suspended. See also Zvi Bar’el, Muslim Brotherhood suffers blow as Egypt court 
anulls constitutional panel HA’ARETZ, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-
east/muslim-brotherhood-suffers-blow-as-egypt-court-anulls-constitutional-panel-1.423595. 
152 On Afghanistan, see for example United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, Afghanistan: Draft Constitution Could Codify Repression, Apr. 17, 2003, 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1477 (observing “There 
is no clear evidence that the United States has been sufficiently involved in [Afghanistan’s] 
constitution-drafting process to ensure that universal human rights are guaranteed. Through a 
contractor, U.S. assistance has concentrated on providing technical and logistical support for the 
drafting committee and assistance in the public consultation process.”), Mir Hermatullah Sadat, 
The Implementation of Constitutional Human Rights in Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 11, 
no. 2 (2004): 48–50, back page, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/3sadat.pdf?rd=1 (noting that “the international 
community and the UN have been generally ineffective in promoting human rights in 
Afghanistan. The UN has been non-committal because its main agency, United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), wants to maintain a ‘light footprint’ presence in 
Afghanistan”), and Cornelia Schneider, The International Community and Afghanistan’s 
Constitution, 7 PEACE, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL (July 
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some experts continue to endorse precisely this approach, calling for 
limiting engagement on constitution drafting to generic efforts such as 
“communicat[ing] that rule of law works” and “offer[ing] fair 
technical help.”153 A new international strategy should draw a 
principled and valid distinction between the dubious imposition of a 
constitution on a sovereign state and the legitimate active and 
assertive promotion of the inclusion of strong, internationally 
recognized human rights safeguards in any new constitutional text. 
The international community can use a range of diplomatic, 
development, trade, and even military assistance incentives to this 
end, including direct support for those political associations that favor 
adopting international human rights norms as part of their political 
platforms. Admittedly, a positive outcome for this more aggressive 
engagement effort is by no means assured. This reality is underscored 
by the decision of Egyptian authorities to prosecute a number of 
prominent quasi-NGOs
154
 working in the rule of law and democracy-
building sectors for funding and supporting anti-government 
protests.
155
 Nevertheless, supporting such efforts and reinforcing them 
with parallel, meaningful backup by concerned governments will at 
least facilitate the exposure of fault lines where they may exist, thus 
                                                                                                                 
 
2005), 174, 187, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk (noting that Barnett R. 
Rubin, a prominent consultant to Afghanistan’s Constitutional Drafting Commission, “in his 
presentations to the Commission…appeared to be treading very carefully so as not to be 
perceived as interfering with the process. He made a few general suggestions…”). On Iraq, see 
for example J Alexander Their, Writing Iraq’s constitution a chance to change history, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 25, 2005, B–9, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/02/25/EDGJJBG1IT1.DTL&ao=all (making no mention of a role for 
international norms or human rights in Iraq’s new constitution), and Constitution Fight in Iraq, 
PBS Newshour, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-
dec05/iraq_8-29.html (according to Spence Spencer, Washington director of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group, “I can speak from my own experience [in Iraq] that we 
were very strongly cautioned to make sure that the technical assistance that we provided was 
good and technical only and to leave the drafting and the decision-making to the Iraqis 
themselves.”) 
153 Nathan J. Brown, Americans, Put Away Your Quills, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45951. See also 
Ginsburg, supra note 145. 
154 These groups include the U.S. based International Republican Institute (“IRI”) and 
National Democratic Institute (“NDI”), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation based in 
Germany. According to the IRI, criminal prosecution of its staff represents “a politically 
motivated effort to squash Egypt’s growing civil society groups, orchestrated through the courts, 
in part by Mubarak-era hold overs.” IRI Statement on Rumored Prosecution of Americans in 
Egypt, INT’L REPUBLICAN INST. (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-
center/news/iri-statement-rumored-prosecution-americans-egypt. 
155 See Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, Charges Against U.S.-Aided Groups Come with History 
of Distrust in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A6 (discussing Egypt’s prosecution of 
nonprofit organizations). 
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clarifying to what extent emerging governments are genuinely 
prepared to adopt and abide by international norms. 
C. Redouble Diplomacy: Identifying State Practices Inconsistent with 
Consensus Resolution 16/18 and the Ongoing Problem with 
Blasphemy Prosecutions 
Concerned parties should redouble their public and private 
diplomatic initiatives targeting states that have previously abstained 
from or voted in favor of defamation of religion resolutions. 
Informational outreach campaigns should identify state practices 
inconsistent with Resolution 16/18 norms as well as the ongoing 
deleterious impact associated with prosecution of blasphemy or 
defamation of religion offenses. These outreach efforts can also 
incorporate examples of best practices that highlight protection of 
religious freedom while simultaneously upholding freedom of 
expression.
156
 Developing these examples can help concretize the 
risks associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards 
and norms associated with combating intolerance or authorizing an 
international norm upholding defamation of religion.  
Despite the 2011 consensus, a meaningful reduction in subjective 
and discriminatory prosecutions of expression premised on protecting 
religious beliefs is difficult to discern. For example, consider the 
Tunisian government’s decision to prosecute Nabil Karoui, the 
director of satellite broadcaster Nessma TV, for airing Persepolis, an 
animated film that includes a brief representation of god as imagined 
from a child’s point of view.157 Under the press and criminal codes of 
l’ancien regime, Karoui has been charged with insulting a recognized 
religion
158
 and harming public order and good morals
159—offenses 
that carry a maximum jail term of between two to five years. Several 
days after the film’s screening, which apparently attracted only 1 
percent of the TV-viewing audience
160
 but was nevertheless described 
by some as a provocation,
161
 suspected “Salafist activists” allegedly 
                                                                                                                 
156 Some of examples of steps that can be taken to this end are discussed in Part IV.D infra. 
157 The Franco-Iranian production directed by graphic novelist Marjane Satrapi 
contemplates the 1979 Islamic revolution and rule of Ayatollah Khomeini through the eyes of a 
young girl. 
158 Art. 48, Republique Tunisienne, CODE DE LA PRESSE, Imprimerie Officielle de la 
République Tunisenne, 2010. 
159 Art. 121(3), Republique Tunisienne, LE CODE PENAL, Imprimerie Officielle de la 
République Tunisenne, 2011. 
160 Thierry Brésillon, Tunisie: Nessma TV, Symbole Ambigu pour un Procès Test, RUE 89 
(Jan. 23, 2012, 7:25 AM), http://blogs.rue89.com/tunisie-libre/2012/01/23/tunisie-nessma-tv-
symbole-ambigu-pour-un-proces-test-226346.  
161 See Anthony Shadid, Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A1 (describing Salafist activists viewing the film as a provocation). 
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firebombed Karoui’s home.162 The trial itself has been postponed 
from November 2011 to January 2012, and most recently was 
rescheduled to April 2012. On the street outside a Tunis courthouse 
during the January hearing, a “group of bearded young radicals 
shouted[,] ‘The people want Nessma closed down’ and ‘You, media 
cowards, know that religion mustn’t be defamed.’”163 Although not 
known for antagonizing deposed President Ben Ali, Karoui has 
argued the case is “a test for freedom of expression and democracy in 
Tunisia.”164 
L’affaire Persepolis, as it has come to be known, illustrates the 
risks associated with enforcing offenses based on insult to religion or 
vague terms open to subjective enforcement. In a country that Human 
Rights Watch labeled “best placed to move forward”165 among the 
states undergoing Arab Spring revolutions, the prosecution may also 
signal a potential rollback of (admittedly select) rights from the 
previous regime. Ironically, the previous regime authorized screening 
of the film in Tunisian theaters, and even contributed towards funding 
a Tunisian dialect translation for local audiences.
166
 While Human 
Rights Watch describes Tunisia’s new Press Code—drafted after the 
revolution but not yet in force—as “significantly more liberal,” the 
legislation maintains defaming state-recognized religions as a 
criminal offense,
167
 an approach that, on its face, stands at odds with 
the 2011 consensus. 
Egypt also augurs poorly as a bellwether for compliance with the 
UNHRC’s 2011 consensus resolution. In one incident, billionaire 
Egyptian Coptic Naguib Sawiris tweeted a caricature of Mickey 
Mouse with a beard and Minnie Mouse in what was interpreted to be 
conservative Islamic garb. Instead of the Walt Disney Company suing 
                                                                                                                 
162 Tunisia Must Drop Charges Against TV Boss over ‘Persepolis’ Screening, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/29264. 
163 Trial of Tunisian TV Chief Who Aired ‘Persepolis’ Postponed, FR. 24, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20120123-trial-tunisian-television-chief-postponed-nessma-tv-
nabil-karoui-persepolis-april-19-adjourned (last updated Jan. 23, 2012).  
164 Le Procès de L’affaire Persepolis Reprend à Tunis, LA NOUVELLE TRIB. (Jan. 23, 
2012), http://www.lnt.ma/actualites/le-proces-de-laffaire-persepolis-reprend-a-tunis-23815.html 
(“[C]e sera un test pour la liberté d’expression et la démocratie en Tunisie.”). 
165 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 10 (2012). 
166 Ulysse Gosset, Nébil Karoui: “En Tunisie, Je Suis Dans la Peau de Salman Rushdie”, 
L’EXPRESS (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/nebil-
karoui-en-tunisie-je-suis-dans-la-peau-de-salman-rushdie_1074321.html.  
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 165, at 636. In another recent case, a Tunisian 
court sentenced two individuals (one in absentia) to seven years in prison “for violation of 
morality, and disturbing public order” after they posted depictions of a naked prophet 
Mohammed to Facebook. Tarek Amara, Tunisians jailed for Facebook cartoons of Prophet, 
REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-tunisia-facebook-
idUSBRE8341FO20120405. 
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for copyright infringement, he was hauled before Egypt’s chief 
prosecutor and two separate charges of defamation of Islam were 
filed against him.
168
 Although the courts did not address the 
legitimacy of a criminal offense grounded in protecting select 
religious beliefs from perceived insult, both charges were dismissed 
for lack of standing.
169
 Other defendants have been less fortunate. In 
February 2012, an Egyptian criminal court convicted septuagenarian 
comic actor Adel Imam for “defaming Islam” based on his role in a 
2007 film.
170
 In another defamation case, an Egyptian juvenile court 
sentenced a 17-year-old Christian student, Gamal Abdou Massoud, to 
a three-year jail term “after he insulted Islam and published and 
distributed pictures that insulted Islam and its Prophet.”171 
In Indonesia, another state that voted in favor of the consensus 
resolution of 2011, the Constitutional Court “upheld the country’s 
[1965] anti-blasphemy law . . . which imposes criminal penalties of 
up to five years’ imprisonment on individuals who deviate from the 
basic teachings of the official religions.”172 As the Special Rapporteur 
on Religious Freedom observed, this ruling evidenced “resistance to 
abandoning the criminalization of blasphemy or to repealing 
discriminatory provisions that purport to combat ‘defamation of 
religions.’”173  
The provision continues to be enforced, even in a post-consensus 
era. Most recently, police arrested an Indonesian civil servant for 
creating a Facebook page in support of atheism.
174
 After being held in 
detention for over two months, Alexander Aan was indicted in April 
                                                                                                                 
168 Egypt Businessman Naguib Sawiris Faces Blasphemy Trial, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16473759.  
169 Egypt court dismisses Sawiris insulting Islam case, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2012,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192283; Court dismisses Islam insult 
case against tycoon Sawiris, EGYPT INDEPENDENT, Mar. 3, 2012, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/court-dismisses-islam-insult-case-against-tycoon-
sawiris. 
170 Adel Imam is Sentenced to Jail over Islam Insult, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-16858553. The actor was sentenced to three 
months and his appeal is still before the court. Adel Imam’s appeal against contempt of religion 
jail sentence adjourned, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/adel-imams-appeal-against-contempt-religion-jail-
sentence-adjourned. 
171 Egypt sends Christian student to jail for insulting Islam, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2012, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE83309420120404. 
172 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Interim Report on Elimination of 
all Forms of Religious Intolerance, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 44, n.42, 
UN Doc. A/65/207 (Jul. 29, 2010) (by Asma Jahangir). 
173 Id. ¶ 44.  
174 Syofiardi Bachyul Jb, Atheist Civil Servant Arrested for Blasphemy, JAKARTA POST 
(Jan. 20, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/20/atheist-civil-servant-
arrested-blasphemy.html. 
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2012 under Criminal Code articles 156a(a) and 156a(b)
175
 for 
allegedly deliberately expressing feelings “which principally have the 
character of being at enimity [sic] with, abusing or staining a religion, 
adhered to in Indonesia” and intentionally “prevent[ing] a person to 
adhere to any religion based on the belief of the allmighty [sic] 
God.”176 The offense carries a maximum imprisonment term of five 
years. 
The climate for religious intolerance in Indonesia is particularly 
problematic for atheists, among others,
177
 given that the republic’s 
constitution provides that the “State shall be based upon the belief in 
the One and Only God.”178 As the United States Department of State 
bluntly observed, the Indonesian “government does not allow for not 
believing in God.”179 Plainly, this constitutional mandate appears at 
odds with the 2011 UN consensus calling on states to “foster religious 
freedom and pluralism by promoting the ability of members of all 
religious communities to manifest their religion, and to contribute 
openly and on an equal footing to society.”180 The provision instead 
indicates an approach based on the desire to punish expression that is 
perceived as critical, insulting or even disbelieving of religion. 
Individuals critical of Islam fare no better in the Palestinian 
Authority (“PA”) governed West Bank, where international donors 
play a central role in the development of Palestinian state institutions. 
PA forces arrested Waleed Al-Husseini after a sting operation 
identified him as responsible for Facebook and blog postings 
allegedly defaming Islam.
181
 Security sources maintained it was 
impossible to release Al-Husseini, a Muslim who had renounced his 
faith in favor of atheism, “because [they were] afraid he w[ould] be 
killed by his family.”182 Ultimately, Al-Husseini was given a three-
                                                                                                                 
175 Atheist faces three counts in court, THE JAKARTA POST, Apr. 2, 2012, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/02/atheist-faces-three-counts-court.html. 
176 PENAL CODE OF INDON. arts. 156–56(a), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html. 
177 Indonesia’s “Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to six religious 
groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: INDON. 4 (July–December 
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171653.pdf. The criminal code 
includes provisions that forbid “staining a religion” and preventing “a person to adhere to any 
religion based on the belief of the almighty God.” INDON. PENAL CODE art. 156(a)(a–b).  
179 INDON. CONST. art. 29(1).  
179 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 177, at 4. 
180 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7, at 3, § 6(b).  
181 Palestinian Jailed for Logging on to Facebook as ‘God’ to Criticize Islam, 
HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 12, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/palestinian-jailed-for-logging-on-to-facebook-as-
god-to-criticize-islam-1.324302.  
182 ‘Atheist’ Palestinian Jailed ‘for His Own Safety’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 7, 
2010), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-technology/atheist-palestinian-jailed-for-his-
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year suspended sentence after being detained for a total of nine 
months, much of which was spent in jail without charge.
183
 Since his 
release, security agents have on several occasions arrested and 
allegedly beaten Al-Husseini with cables, destroyed his two 
computers, and “demanded that he stop expressing his views.”184 
Another man from the same West Bank city of Qalqilya faces a 
similar charge after being arrested by police following an altercation 
with his father. According to the police report, “the father called 
police to break up the fight after his son ‘cursed God.’”185 When 
asked about the case, Qalqilya’s deputy police chief asserted that 
police would target anyone who “curses God or any prophets or 
religions.”186  
The Palestinian Authority is still not a voting member of the UN 
and admittedly did not have a say in the 2011 consensus vote. But 
police officials volunteering this type of “mission statement” is 
particularly troubling considering the ongoing role played by 
international actors including the United States in funding and 
training Palestinian police forces in subjects that include the rule of 
law and human rights.
187
 Indeed, this approach to law enforcement 
seems more at home in Saudi Arabia, where Hamza Kashgari recently 
fled for his life after tweeting that he would not bow to Mohammed 
but rather shake hands “as equals do.”188 The views expressed by the 
twenty-three-year-old prompted Saudi Sheikh Nasser Al Omar to 
break down in tears while pleading, between sobs, for the Saudi king 
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186 Id. (quotations omitted).  
187 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-505, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: U.S. 
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Law Section, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT, 
http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/rule-law-section (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (describing an 
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories); PCP and EUPOL COPPS Deliver Pilot 
Human Rights Training, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT (July 
9, 2011), http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/pcp-and-eupol-copps-deliver-pilot-human-rights-
training (describing a training mission undertaken by the EU Police Mission).  
188 Priyanka Boghani, Hamza Kashgari, Saudi Writer, Arrested in Malaysia for Offensive 
Tweet, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 10, 2012, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/saudi-arabia/120210/hamza-
kashgari-saudi-writer-arrested-malaysia. 
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to arrest Kashgari and charge him with apostasy.
189
 Kashgari’s short-
lived effort to flee the Saudi kingdom ended when he was detained 
and promptly deported from Malaysia “for allegedly insulting Islam 
and the Prophet Muhammad.”190 As this Article goes to press, 
Kashgari remains in a prison in the capital, Riyadh, “with no official 
word on if and when he will stand trial.”191 
Coupled with ongoing subjective and discriminatory prosecutions 
of expression premised on protecting religious beliefs, certain states 
continue to proffer distortive assessments of the extent to which their 
legal regimes comport with international human rights standards. 
These inconsistencies should receive more active and critical 
attention, particularly where states purport to faithfully abide by 
international norms. Examples of selective rendering of human rights 
compliance abound, particularly in the area of protecting freedom of 
religion and belief. For example, in a report submitted to the UN 
Secretary General, Pakistan reiterated its view that “the ways and 
means of addressing the issues of defamation and discrimination 
based on religion and belief” should be strengthened and 
diversified.
192
 To this end, Pakistan highlighted steps taken to 
promote interfaith harmony and to combat vilification of religions, 
including the use of “Sections 295, 295–A, 296, 297 and 298 of the 
Pakistan Penal Code.”193  
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Insulting Prophet Tweet, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:22 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16977903. 
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JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 2012, A7. Other Twitter users are finding their tweets subject to similar 
scrutiny. Kuwaiti authorities arrested Hamad al-Naqi in March 2012 for allegedly “defaming the 
Islamic faith and the Prophet, his companions and his wife.” Ahmed Hagagy and Sylvia 
Westall, Kuwaiti denies insulting Prophet on Twitter - lawyer, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/kuwait-twitter-idUSL6E8F30J420120403. In the 
wake of this arrest, Kuwaiti lawmakers have voted in favor of increasing the legal penalty from 
a jail term to death for insulting God and the prophet Mohammed. “Members of parliament 
must vote on the proposal again in a second session and it would need the approval of the 
country’s ruler before becoming law.” Parliament votes for death penalty in blasphemy cases, 
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 13, 2012, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0413/1224314681842.html. For another 
potential emerging case, see also Another Twitter user accused of apostasy, EMIRATES 24/7, 
Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/another-twitter-user-accused-of-
apostasy-2012-03-25-1.450274 (noting outcry among Saudi Twitter users calling for arrest of 
Mohammed Salama for posting allegedly blasphemous statements concerning Islam). 
192 U.N. Secretary-General, Combating Defamation of Religions: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/66/372 (Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, 
Combating Defamation].  
193 Id.  
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What Pakistani authorities omit from this rose-colored portrayal of 
religious freedom is the fact that the penal code continues to serve as 
the wellspring for justifying intolerance and persecution of religious 
minorities. In addition to its selective enforcement, the penal code 
provides for, among other things, wildly disproportionate penalties 
when the religion criticized is Islam,
194
 the absence of any mens rea 
requirement for “directly or indirectly, defil[ing] the sacred name of 
the Holy Prophet Muhammad” or other Muslim “holy personages,”195 
and the criminalization of elements of the Ahmadi faith.
196
  
Not to be outdone, Qatar reported to the UN Secretary General: 
. . . that its society is governed by moral, social, religious and 
cultural values that promote equality and prohibit 
discrimination . . . . These values are inspired by the Islamic 
faith and reflected in the Constitution and relevant legislation 
. . . . The State is striving to become a model of peaceful 
coexistence between different faiths . . . and ensuring respect 
for religious freedoms.
197
  
Remarkably in the same report, Qatar cited provisions from its 
Criminal Code as an example of its comportment with international 
standards.
198
 But from an international human rights perspective, 
these provisions on their face embody precisely the kinds of norms 
that operate to violate the principles of equality, discrimination, and 
freedom of religion or belief. Under Qatari law, an individual is 
subject to:  
up to seven years’ imprisonment for denigrating or insulting 
the deity by any means; making insulting, disparaging or 
blasphemous remarks about the Koran; making insulting 
remarks about Islam or an Islamic ritual; defaming any of the 
revealed religions; insulting the prophet of a religion; or 
desecrating a place of worship of a revealed religion or any 
object found in that place.
199
 
                                                                                                                 
194 Compare PAK. PENAL CODE art. 295–B (providing a punishment of imprisonment for 
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Christianity. For a longer discussion of how this term has been employed by the OIC and others, 
see Blitt, supra note 4, at 156–159. 
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The selective and distortive interpretation of human rights law 
illustrated in these examples sheds light on the unlikely durability of 
the 2011 consensus insofar as these state practices betray a disconnect 
between Resolution 16/18 and the willingness to abandon criminal 
prosecution of individuals who are perceived to insult or criticize 
certain protected religious views. Accordingly, such laws should be 
utilized as a tangible departure point for renewed diplomatic 
engagement to encourage states to take another look at the risks 
associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards and 
norms associated with combating intolerance or upholding 
defamation of religion. This dialogue should prompt some hard 
questions. For example, Should we rethink celebrating an 
international “consensus” on combating intolerance where certain 
state practices operate in direct opposition to it? Moreover, given the 
linkage between incitement and defamation espoused by certain 
states, should implementation measures around Resolution 16/18 
reasonably proceed without first clearly precluding the lawfulness of 
defamation of religion? Based on the outcome of these dialogues, a 
sharper sense of Resolution 16/18’s viability should emerge, 
including whether a return to the more fundamental and still 
unresolved debate over the legitimacy of defamation of religion may 
be necessary. 
D. Fight Intolerance at Home 
The United States and others should take concrete measures to 
address the more egregious instances of state-sanctioned or tolerated 
discrimination, particularly as it may relate to profiling, dress codes 
and other measures that may impinge on religious freedom. Further, 
the government and other community leaders should take a more 
proactive approach to unequivocally denounce “grassroots” and state-
based initiatives that feed and breed xenophobia.
200
  
In a number of recent incidents “internal” public diplomacy could 
have done more to educate and avert potentially discriminatory state 
action. For example, in Tennessee, state legislators attempted to brand 
                                                                                                                 
200 Other examples beyond the United States come to mind, such as the Swiss ban on 
minarets, also approved by public referendum. To date, the European Court of Human Rights 
has declared two petitions on this issue inadmissible because the plaintiffs lacked standing as 
victims. Petitioners in both cases had neither sought nor been denied authorization by the Swiss 
authorities to construct a minaret. See Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Prohibition on Building Minarets in Switzerland: Applications Inadmissible (Jul. 8, 
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any organization that endorses sharia as a terrorist group. The wildly 
xenophobic draft bill asserted, among other things, that: 
[K]nowing adherence to sharia and to foreign sharia 
authorities is prima facie evidence of an act in support of the 
overthrow of the United States government and the 
government of this state through the abrogation, destruction, 
or violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions 
by the likely use of imminent criminal violence and terrorism 
with the aim of imposing sharia on the people of this state.
201
 
Ultimately, in the face of public outcry and media attention, the final 
bill as passed erased any mention of sharia.
202
 
In another widely publicized instance from 2010, Oklahoma voters 
were presented with a referendum question that ostensibly sought to 
“Save Our State”203 by ostracizing a single religion for discriminatory 
treatment at the hands of the government.
204
 Seventy percent of voters 
endorsed the constitutional amendment which proposed expressly 
“forbid[ding] courts from considering or using international law . . . . 
[or] Sharia Law.”205 A court petition challenging the amendment’s 
constitutionality resulted in a temporary restraining order followed by 
a preliminary injunction enjoining the state “from certifying the 
election results for State Question 755.”206 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the injunction based on the 
plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim that the amendment 
condemned Islam and exposed Muslims to disfavored treatment.
207
  
                                                                                                                 
201 S.B. 1028, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (as introduced by Sen. Ketron). For the 
bill’s complete legislative history, see Bill Information for SB1028, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
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General Election—Nov. 2, 2010, OKLA. ST. ELECTION BOARD, 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
206 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d No. 10–6273, 
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).  
207 Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10–6273, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475, at *37–40 (10th Cir. Jan. 
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While the courts rightly identified this anti-constitutional and anti-
American initiative for what it was, the reality remains that measures 
like it tap into a bigoted stream of the political discourse in the United 
States and elsewhere.
208
 These and other proposed measures that 
violate domestic constitutional law and international law principles 
present a concrete opportunity for civil society and government to get 
in front of manifestations of intolerance. This can be done through 
non-legislative measures designed to ostracize those that would 
discriminate, impose unequal treatment, or otherwise unduly restrict 
freedom of religion or belief. Public outcry, media attention, and 
reliance on the judiciary can all be effective tools. But each can be 
bolstered through ongoing educational efforts to help authoritatively 
dispel oversimplification and misconceptions concerning minority 
groups, religious practices, and even the function and status of 
domestic law. Moreover, these measures are in no way contingent on 
UN resolutions, and can serve as a tangible and good faith 
demonstration of the sincere commitment to combat intolerance and 
discrimination based on religious belief. Importantly, they also do not 
require relying on tactics that themselves foster an environment of 
discrimination and inequality, which in turn prohibit fair exercise of 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has called attention to the flaws underpinning current 
efforts to move away from the decade old debate over defamation of 
religion. By advancing a consensus approach to combatting 
intolerance without addressing and accounting for the false linkages 
that continue to be made between incitement and defamation, states 
concerned with protecting human rights have created an opening that 
risks perpetuating defamation-type offenses under the ostensible 
sanction of international law.  
                                                                                                                 
 
10, 2012). 
208 The failed Oklahoma initiative aligns with Republican presidential candidate hopeful 
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movement against Sharia law, including the Oklahoma constitutional amendment).  
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The evidence discussed above should shatter any illusion 
regarding a genuine consensus around an approach to combatting 
intolerance premised on “open public debate of ideas” and 
“foster[ing] religious freedom and pluralism.”209 Malaysia’s 
deplorable yet perfunctory decision to abide by Saudi Arabia’s 
request for the deportation of alleged blasphemer Hamza Kashgari is 
deadly evidence that defamation of religion remains alive and well, 
and has even garnered sufficient international legitimacy to warrant 
summary extradition for the purpose of its speedy enforcement. From 
this perspective, the consensus approach also has failed in a 
profoundly practical regard by doing nothing to curb prosecutions of 
individuals on the basis of utterances or actions deemed blasphemous 
of a predominant faith. A potential death sentence for three little 
tweets throws this reality into unsettling relief. 
This grim reality should be deeply disturbing to those concerned 
with maintaining the integrity of the international human rights 
framework. More immediately, however, it should serve as a trigger 
for reassessing the wisdom of a consensus strategy premised upon 
sidestepping or ignoring the specter of defamation of religion. Rather 
than maintain the delusion that combating intolerance will prove a 
viable end to a divisive debate, we must acknowledge that any 
genuine consensus on this issue is destined to fail unless defamation 
of religion is formally repudiated. Until such a time, progress within 
the Istanbul Process should be suspended. Concerned diplomats and 
human rights activists alike should return to familiar if divisive fault 
lines and redouble efforts to condemn and abolish the criminal 
offense of blasphemy. In Kashgari’s case, such efforts could—and 
should—have included massive international pressure on Malaysia to 
refuse the Saudi request to deport.
210
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More generally moving forward, governments that previously 
voted against UN defamation of religion resolutions should inquire of 
their counterparts that abstained whether they view the fate of 
Kashgari and others similarly situated as comporting with 
international human rights law protections. Likewise, individual OIC 
members with ties to western states should be surveyed and new post-
Arab Spring governments coming online should be encouraged to 
clearly set out their intentions with respect to international human 
rights obligations. These efforts may bear fruit in identifying a 
previously unavailable critical mass of states willing to overturn the 
UN’s defamation of religion precedent. At the same time, a good faith 
effort to address genuine claims of discrimination, intolerance and 
incitement should proceed apace, despite a freeze on identifying 
implementing norms relating to Resolution 16/18 and its offspring. 
These measures can go a long way in building good will and 
demonstrating a sincere commitment to tackling the challenge of 
intolerance without recourse to criminal punishment. Even if a UN-
sanctioned rejection of defamation of religion proves unachievable 
and we are left debating its illegitimacy, nothing can justify 
supporting a framework intended to combat intolerance that allows 
acts of unbridled intolerance to continue to flourish. 
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